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BRIEF
ANDWASHINOTON
OREOON
OFCALIFORNIA,
STATES
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ASAMICI
The States of California, Oregon and Washington
file this brief as ami~i curiae in support of appellee
for the purpose of presenting to this honorable Court
their position concerning some of the important questions of fact and law involved upon this appeal.

PREI.TMINARYSTATEMENT.

The instru1t case concerns the validity of the curfew
and exclusion orders imposed upon persons of Japanese ancestry residing in Pacific Coast military areas,
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by the Commanding General of the Western Defense
Command. .An appeal was taken to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals (No. 10,308) after judgment of conviction in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Northern Division,
upon an indictment charging appellant with having
violated Public Law 503 (77th Cong., 2nd Scss., Ch.
191; 18 U.S.C. sec. 97A) by virtue of the disobedience
of the curfew (Public Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed.
Reg. 2543, :March 24, 1942) and evacuation (Civilian
Exclusion Order No. 57, May 10, 1942) orders of Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt, the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command and Fourth
Army. The whole matter in controversy now comes
before this Court for consideration by order (Tr. 43)
made pursuant to Section 239 of the Judicial Code
(28 U.S.C. sec. 346).
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The defendant, an American citizen of Japanese
ancestry, at the time of the said disobedience resided
in the City of Seattle, State of Washington. The companion case of Minoru ·Yasui v. -United States, No.
871, also before this Court, arises out of a judf,'lllent
of conviction in the United States District Court for
the District of Oregon upon an indictment for violation of Public Law 503 by reason of the disobedience
of the said curfew order. Yasui, born at Hood River,
Oregon, and a person of iTapanese ancestry, resided
at the time of the alleged violation in the City of
Portland, State of Oregon. The full judicial history
of these cases, together .with the pertinent statutes,
orders and proclamations, appears in the Government's briefs. Other American citizens, persons of
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AREAS NOS I AND 2

MILITARY

J apauese ancestry residing in the State of California,
have been convicted for violation of the curfew procla1
mation and similar exclusion orders.

DEFENSE ,COMMAND
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THE INTEREST OF THE STATES OF OALIFORNIA,
OREGON AND WASHINGTON.
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The States of California, Oregon and Washington
face the prospect of the first o~laught upon continental United States by the Imperial Forces of Japan.
'l'hese Pacific Coast States form the western portion
of the Western Defense Command and contain within
them Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2 as defined by the
Commanding General of the Wes tern Defense Command and Fourth Army. The westernmost boundaries of these States form a Combat Zone one hundred miles wide, extending from the WashingtonCanadian border down tbe Oregon and California
coasts and along the California-Mexican border (Chart
1, opposite). A field army occupies the length and
breadth of these Pacific Coast States. Over one
thousand miles of coastline must be guarded, not
only against attack by sea, land and .air hut 'also
against infiltration by enemy agents. Many strategic
naval and army installations and establishments, aircraft factories, shipyards and other war plants, army

tl••
to Tuh LIJr:• and X&il11.A&r
(Z) Vhlt
(;,) 4 lhd ted 01aber of oert&ili •• ... U&l
.. ploy.,
f.-dtral

(4i) Certain peraoa., ot 60% or ha1 Je,..
D••• a.noeatry
Japa.oue win,
(6) Certdn
hu•ba.nda who han aiud

• '.; :.;I
.· . '\,'._\;,'-j
•• ·' i<··.1
-~,-,·

V/~_

or Cauor11l11.1
'blood oblU ..

hu bffg DM-ren Whoae endronHnt
J•panue
wt~
too lll to k eft~t••
(e) l'enona
out da.n,;er to Ure
(7) Tot&lly dHr, diab or bllod ad la•
lnatl tutloa
in peAAl taf\J.•
(0) l'•noae looa.roeratld
t.uUone.

:-~~:.:.i__._

V/.//.///~--·

NEVADA

UTAH

·1
.:'..-'?:.
. .. '..·":-

•

--

.·.·;'.t1iK;~~ii:

PROtilBITj:_9 MILITARY
AREA I

~./././h

PI\OHIBIT[O

1

son of Jnpnnese nnccstry residing nt San Francisco, California,
and raises qur.stions identical with those in the instant and the
Yasui cnscs. A question concerning the right of the defendant to
tnke an appeal from the trial court's order therein (U.S.D.C.
N.D., Cal., S.D., No. 27635-W) has been certified to this Court and
accepted for decision.
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training camps, posts and arsenals, vital defense resources and utilities are situated in these States.
Upon the declaration of war immediate action had
to be taken for the further defense of the Pacific
Coast and for the protection of national defense materials, premises and utilities. 2 88.5 percent of the
Japanese population of the country was concentrated
in the States of ·California, Oregon and Washington.•
An estimate made of the situation by the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command showed
that the Pacific Coast was threatened with invasion by the forces of Japan; that there were over
112,000 persons of Japanese ancestry on the Pacific
Coast living near prospective landing beaches and
within the vicinity of defense plants, materials,
utilities and military installatiQns; that this group
was largely unassimilated and that many within it
possessed strong ethnic, religious, ideological and
family -ties with the enemy Japan; that both the time
required to examine this large group and the lack of
an adequate test and trained personnel made treatment upon an individual basis impossible in the face
of the emergency which required prompt action. The
preponderance of the problem on the Pacific Coast is
illustrated by the accompanying map showing the
Japanese population of the 'United States (Chart 2,
opposite). The Commanding General therefore reached
The m1ss10n of the W estcrn Defense Command and Fourth
Army is:
1. Defense of the Pacific Coast of the Western Defense Command against attack by sea, land and air;
2. Local protection of establishments and communications vital
to the national defense for which adequate defense cannot be provided by local civilian authorities.
1 1940 U. S. CensUB·(16th).
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the decision that all persons of Japanese ancestry
roust be removed as a group from the military areas
and that, prior to this being •accomplished, all such
persons were to observe certain curfew hours.
The States of California, Oregon and Washington
believe that this problem within their States, from
both a legal and practical viewpoint, should be treated
solely as a military matter. 'l'he possibility that the
exclusion orders might be held invalid and that persons of Japanese ancestry might be permitted to return before a time justified by the military situation
is of the deepest concern to these States. The return
of these people while the military necessity for their
exclusion remains would require the police authorities
of the Pacific Coast States to deal with the danger
which-the military 3:uthorities believe the presence
of persons of Japanese ancestry presents to the defense of these States and the maintenance of internal
Eecurity therein. To leave what is essentially a military problem to the civilian authorities for solution
unfortunately would tend to confuse the present status
of these people ,;ith the social and economic questions
which have existed with reference to them in these
States for many years. Their return against the advice of the military authorities undoubtedly would
give rise, under tl1e highly emotional conditions of war
intensified by such incidents as the recent execution
of captured American flyers, to an unreasoning public
reaction. 'l'he prospect of public disturbances would
be very real.
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The cases now beforn this Court call for a statement
of the occasions when military authorities in tune of
war and ;within a theater of operations may exercise
control over persons, citizens and aliens alike, for the
defense of the area against invasion, attack, sabotage,
espionage and fifth column activities, and generally to
further the prosecution of the war. For example, the
. Commanding General of the Wes tern Defense Command has issued_dim-out proclamations 4 for the purpose of reducing the amount :0f offshore lighting so
that it cannot be used as an aid by enemy submarines
in their attack upon coastwise shipping. These orders
presumably supersede state lighting laws and are
valid although they affect the use Qf property ancI
restrict freedom of movement. Other measures may
have to be undertaken, such as prohibiting public use
of beach areas and requiring the evacuation of persons
from areas subjected to enemy air attack. A clarification of the authority :0f the President and his subordinate military commanders to exercise such authority in time of war witl1in a theater of operations,
and the right of Congress to provide sanction for the
enforcement of these military orders in the civil
Courts, will assist local and state authorities in the
performance of their duties in com1ection with the
war effort.

THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION.

i'

'·

I

•

THE ARGUMENT.

The facts bearing upon the military necessity for
excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry from Pacific Coast military ~reas and imposing cul'few are
made a part of the argument, for once the factual
background out of which these orders were made is
understood the a~plicable legal principles will be selfevident.
In Sterling 1.1. Constanfrn, 287 U.S. 378 (1932), this
Court said, in speaking of the scope of military authority over civilians in the United States:
" * * * there is a permitted range of honest
judgment as to .the measures to be taken in meeting force with force, in suppressing violence and
restoring order, for without such liberty to take
immediate decisions, the power itself would be
useless. Such measures, conceived in good faith,
in the face of the emergency and directly related
to the quelling of the disorder or the prevention
of its continuance, fall within the discretion of
the Executive in the exercise of his authority to
maintain peace." (p. 399.)

Thus the interest of the States of California, Oregon
and Washington in the specific and general questions
raised here is clear.
Proclamations Nos. 10 (August 5, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 6631) and
12 (October 10, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 8377)-control of lighting
within restricted zones, Washington, Oregon and California.

• I
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In .time of war, may a military commander in a
military area within the United States exercise certain
controls over civilians and civilian authorities for the
purpose of defending the area against attack and
threatened invasion or preventing sabotage, espionage
or other acts endangering the prosecution of the War 1
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Keeping this test in mind, it is believed that agreement can be reached that the military situation on
the Pacific Coast with reference to the concentration
and characteristics of the Japanese population presented a dangerous threat to the internal security of
the area and the successful prosecution of the war
and that the measures taken by the President and the
Commanding General were conceived in good faith
and were directly related to preventing the danger.

I

I

6

Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U.S. 415, 419;
Clark v. U. S., 99 U.S. 493, 495;
Wiymore, Evd. (3d ed. 1940 sec. 2567n);
Jones, Evd. (2d ed. 1908 page 105).
6
Tho courts will take judicial knowledge of matters of public
concern although calculations and inquiries on the subject may be
necessary. lloyt v. Russell, 117 U.S. 401, 404.
In ascertaining matters of fact or of law to be judicially noticed, the court may resort to, or obtain information from, any
source of knowledge w11ich it feels would be helpful. Greeson v.
Imperial Irr. Dist. (C.O.A.-9, 1932), 59 F. (2d) 529, 530.
The court may resort to nny means it deems safe to refresh its
memory. Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37.

t

On the occasion of the treacherous attack by the
Japanese upon Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941,
and upon the declaration of war on the following day
(55 Stats. 795, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., c. 561), the Pacific Coast was in danger of attack by land, sea and
air. 'l~he bulk of our Pacific Fleet lay helpless at
Pearl Harbor. The sudden onslaught, while the J apanese ambassadors were talking peace in Washington,
found this country during the first months of the war
unable to act offensively. The trained and prepared
enemy rapidly added to its gains while this country
hastily improved its defenses and began to dispatch
the first of its for_ces. Because of the relatively light
naval and air forces opposing the enemy in the Far
East, there was an ever present danger that the.Pacific
Coast might be subjected to a major at.tack and possibly an invasion. The military measures taken to
meet the possibility must be viewed in the light of
the situation which then existed. On December 11,
1941, the Western Defense Command, combining the
eight western States and the Territory of Alaska, was
actuated by the War Department and designated as
a "theater of operations". 7
Field Order No. 1, December 14, 1941.
1. The theater of war comprises those areas of land, sen and

7

air which nre, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of
•
tho war.
2. A theater . of operations is an area of the theater of war
necessary for military operation and the administration and sup-,
ply incident to military operation. The War Department designated one or more theaters of operation.
3. A combat zone comprises that part of a theater of operations required for the active operation of the combatant forces
War Departfighting. (Field Service Regulations-Operations,
PMI00-5.)
Bulletin
Wartime
ment, May 22, 1941.
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To judge the emergency which confronted the President and the necessity for the measures taken to meet
it, consideration will have to be given to the military,
political, social and psychological conditions on the
Pacific Coast. In doing this the Court may take notice
of many of the facts to be stated because they are
generally notorious and are public events which are
part IOf the histo1y of the timesn ·or are matters of
public concern upon which .the Court 'may inform
itself by 1·eference to documentary evidence or any
other reliable source. 0

L THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE PAOIFIO OOAST.
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A combat zone was established by the Commanding
General. (See Chart 1, opp. p. 3.) For the first seven
months little occurred to reduce the fear of attack.
On February 23, 1942, oil installations in the vicinity
of Santa Barbara, California, were shelled by a
Japanese submarine. On September 9, 1942, a submarine-based plane dropped incendiary bombs in
the vicinity of Brookings (Mount Emily), Oregon.
The radio station at Estevan, Vancouver Island,
B.C., was shelled by a submarine at midnight on
June 19, 1942. A few days later, an enemy submarine surfaced and shelled shore batteries at Astoria,
Oregon. On lJune 3, 1942, Dutch Harbor, Alaska, was
attacked by iearrier-based planes. On June 7, 1942,
the Japanese invaded continental North America by
occupying the Islands of Attu and Kiska in the Aleutian group. There was an increasing indication that
the enemy had knowledge of our patrols and naval
dispositions, for ships leaving west coast ports were
being intercepted and attacked regularly by enemy
submarines.
This summary makes clear that during this perilous
period the Pacific Coast was in d~nger of additional
attacks and possibly invasion. As late as December,
1942, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, refe1Ting to
the attack on the Hawaiian Islands, declared, in
Zimmerman v. Walker, 132 Fed. (2d) 442:
"The courts judicially know that the whole Pacific Area of the United States has continued in
a state of the gravest emergency; and that the
imminent threat of a resumption of the invasion
persisted.'' (p. 445.)

T
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And speaking with reference to the facts involved in
the present case, it was said:
'' So far as concerns the imminence of danger of
Japanese attack on the Pacific Coast, this court
would be compelled to find that General DeWitt
has a rational ground to expect it." (United
States v. Ilirabayashi (CCA-9), No. 10,308; Denman, C.J., dissenting from Certification of Questions to the Supreme Court, p. 13.)
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The significance of the concentration and characteristics of the Japanese population within the States of
the Pacific Coast must be appraised in the light of this
military situation.
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Prior to their exclusion, 88.5 percent of all persons
of Japanese ancestry in the United States resided in
the Pacific :Coast States: 93,717 in California, 14,565
in Washington, and 4071 in Oregon-nearly all living
within the coastal area designated as Military Area No.
1. (Chart 3, opp.) 'rhe ·Japanese of the Pacific Coast
area on the whole have remained a group apart and
inscrutable to their neighbors. They represent an
8
unassimilated, homogenous element which in varying
degrees is closely related through ties of race, language, religion, custom and ideology to the Japanese
Empire.
8 Fa.nington v. Tokushige, 11 Fed. (2d) 710 (CCA-9, 1926):
"It is a matter of common knowledge that tho ,Japanese
do not readily assimilate with other races, and especially with
the white race." (p. 714.)
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A. Japanese Natio
nalistic Organizatio
ns of the Pacific Co
ast.
Th

ese activities were
carried on through
numerous
Japanese organizatio
ns sponsored or re
ceiving support from Japan. 9
Former Attorney
General Earl
Warren of Californ
ia, and now Gover
nor, stated before .the Tolan Com
mittee :10
"An additional fa
ctor in the danger
which would probab
and one
ly not be apparent
to
unfamiliar with th
e California Japane persons
se lies in
the fact that the J
apa.nese in this Stat
e are very
closely organized.
There .are a large
number of
Japanese organizatio
ns covering every
branch of
life. There are Ja
pane
cial, educational, so se agricultural, commercial, religious, and
patriotic
associations in ever
y Japanese comm
unity. Almost every Japanese
in the State is incl
one or more of thes
uded in
e
organizations.
•
*
*
*
*
"However, the in
•
ter-relationship of *
the many
Japanese associatio
ns and their contro
l over the
Japanese populatio
n of the State has
been a matter of general know
ledge and has been
ap
from items appear
ing in the Japane parent
se
papers. These Japa
nese newspaper ite newsshow that iii the pa
m
st years there has be s also
en a close

An account of
book compiled nnd the work of these organizations ap
published in Japan partly paid for by American Japanepears in a
"Zaibei Nippon Zin in 1940, printed in Japanese, anse. It was
d
Shi "-" story of
10 Hear
the Japanese in Amentitled
ings and Reports Hi
erica".
of
House Select Comm
ing National Defe
ittee
Enemy Aliens and nse Migration on Problems of EvacInvestigatafter referred to asothers from Prohibited Military Zouation of
ne
tho Tolan Committ
cl.sea, p. 10974.)
ee. (Part 29, Sans, here•
Fran•
9

13

relationship betwee
n Japanese associ
California and pare
ations in
nt
tions in Japan and or governmental organizathat on many occa
sions the
associations in Califo
rn
assisted in the war ia have contributed to and
effort of the J apau
ese Goverrunent.
"While we have no
co
the number of Japa mplete information as to
nese organizations
in California, Japane
existing
se sources indicate
that the
number is large. 'l~
hus the public pres
s carried
an item from Toky
o April 25, 1941, to
the effect
that the Japanese
'Central Council of
Overseas
Organizations anno
unced that ther~
ar
Japanese organizatio
e 2,700
ns iii the United
representatives of
States,
which will meet fo
r
a
convention in Tokyo in N
ovember 1941.'
*
*
*
•
*
*
"That the Japane*se
associations as orga
nizations
have in the past supp
orted and aided the
military
campaigns of the Ja
panese Governmen
t is beyond
doubt. 1'he contrib
utions of these as
sociations
toward the Japanese
war effort have be
en
published in Japane
se papers througho freely
ut Cali10
fornia. •
1°•Someof these ne
wspaper items a.ro
"March 13, 1941
as follows:
.-T
Japr1n through the hirty-two bales of tinfoil were sh
tributed by Japancso Japanese consulate general and weipped to
associations of Fresno
re conCounty, Kern Coun
Delnno, and San Be
ty,
rn
"July 6, 1!)41.-Cc ardino.
nt
.ra
l
Ca
lif
or
ni
a
nounces the collecti
on and transmission Japanese .A.s.wciationanto the War Minist
the sum of $3,542.0
ry of
"March 6, 1938.-G5..
Yoshida, San Francis
tion, yesterday sent
co Japanese As
400 pounds of tinfo
of 2,800 pounds of tin
il, making a record sociafoil which he hns co
llected, according tototal
records of the consul
the
ge
ne
ra
l's of e."
The J apanesc Vetcra
ns Associafic
tion was similarly en
"March 20, 1941.-l
ga
Associations in Japa t is announced that the War ged :
n.
Veterans
Ge
rm
any, and
spirit of the Axis
Treaty, have formedItaly, in keeping with the
joint and advisory
com-
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It has been the polic
y of the Japanese
Government
to maintain these
ties with the Japa
nese in this
country.
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'' At one time it is said the association [Japanese
Veterans Association of America] numbered
8,000 members and at the meeting at which dissolution was decided upon some 300 representatives were present.

*

*

*

*

*

*

•

"This organization sponsored the tour of Maj.
G. Tanaka, of the ·Japanese Army, and a member
of the army general staff, who arrived in San
Francisco January 1, 1941, with full uniform,
sword, and medals and toured the State lecturing
before various Japanese groups, eventually returning to Japan via New York. While here, he
is reported tQ have said: 'Japan and the United
States will go to war this autumn.' " (pp. 10,97410,976.) lOb
Over 124 separate Japanese organizations along the
Pacific Coast were engaged, in varying degrees, in
common pro-Japanese purposes, with local branches
of these parent organizations numbering more than
310. There were 100 fascistic or rnilitaTistic organizations in Japan having some relation, either direct
or indirect, with Japanese organizations or individuals in the United States. Many had branch organizations in the United States and directed the activities of these branches. A line of control existed from
the Japanese Government. 11
mittees to aid and establish the new world order. There are 3½
million veterans and reservists, headed by General Imci, who have
pledged their cooperation to Axis aims.•'
"July 6, 1941. The Japanese Veterans Association of America,
in its sixty-sixth meeting, reported the collection of $5,968.60,
making a total of 829,440.34 yen collected and transmitted to
,Japan for use of the military services • • •"
1obsee footnote 10 supra.
11'fhe Court will take judicial notice of the Japanization pro;
gram in the United States. (See Akira Ono v. Un-itcd States, 267
Fed, 359, 362 (1920).)

1

The Hokubei Butoku Kai or Military Virtue Society of North .America had headquarters in the town
of Alvarado, Califon1ia, and a branch office in Tokyo.
It.s purpose was to instill the Japanese cod~ of Bushido among the Japanese throughout North America.
.Another militaristic organization was the Heimusha
Kai, the purpose of which was furthering the J apanese war effort. Its prospectus read as follows:
"The world should realize that our military action in China is based upon the significant fact
that we are forced to fight under realistic circumstances. As a matter of historical fact, whenever the Japanese government begins a military
campaign, we, Japanese, must be united and
everyone of us must do his part.
"As far as our patriotism is concerned, the world
knows that we are superior to any other nation.
However, as long as we are staying on foreign
soil, what can we do for our mother country1
All our. courageous fighters are fighting at the
front today, forgetting their parents, wives and
children in their homes t It is beyond our imagination, the manner in which our imperial soldiers
are sacrificing their lives at the front line, bomb
after bomb, deaths after deaths t Whenever we
read and hear this sad news, who can keep from
crying in sympathy~ Therefore, we, the J apanese in the United States, have been contributing
a huge amount of money for· war relief funds
and numerous comforting bags for our imperial
soldiers.
"Today, we, Japanese in the United 'States, who
are not able to sacrifice our lives for our National
cause are now firmly resolved to stand by to sett.le
the present war as early as possible. 'We are
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the
Government. Maintaining close cooperation with
e.u
Consulate, it carried out the directives of that offic
There were many other organizations which, by
the
their names, indicate that their main purpose was
furthering and supporting of the nationalistic pro111
~ram of Japan.
"The significance of these -integrated Japanese
associations lies in the fact that through them it
is possible for those at the head to exercise con-

proud to say that our daily happy life in America
is dependent upon the protective power of Great
Japan.' We are facing a critical emergency, and
we will take strong action as planned. We do
hope and beg you all12 to cooperate with us for
our National Cause. "

;1

I
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of
. A militant Japanese organization composed
o
Japanese ex-service men was lmown as the Kanj
Kai and was fo1med to support military action taken
folby the Japanese Government in the Orient. The
rtlowing telegram from the Japanese Army Depa
the
ment was received by this group following upon
first
organization of the society, and was read at the
executive board meeting:
'' During this emergency, you officials are doing
your utmost for· the Country and the Army Department is very grateful. For the establishment
of peace in the Orient, it is necessary for us to
adopt positive steps in China.' 113

u Article 3 of its by-laws provides:
ese asso"This association is organized by the local Japan late genconsu
ese
Japan
the
ciation under the jurisdiction of
Part 29,
eral of San Francisco." (Tolan Committee Hearings,
Warren, p. 10976.)
ns is indicarnThe translation of the names of these organizatio
tive of their objects: .
Kaigun Kyokai (Navy .Association) ;
Aikoku Fujin Kai (Patriotic Women's S()(.'.iety);
Red Hen.rt
Jugo Sekissei Kai (Behind the Gun Society or
Society);
Uokoku Kai (Society for Service to the Country); for ContribuAikokuk.i Kcnno Kisei Domci (Patriotic League
tion to the Airplane Fund) ;
Jugo Kai (Behind the Gun Society);
Asiatic CoKo-A-Sokushin Kai (Society for the Promotion of
Prospcrity);
Kokuryu Kai (Black Dragon Society);
Kibei Shim.in Kai (Kibei Society);
Hokyoku Kai (Rising Sun Society);
ica.);
Zaibei Nipponjin Kai (Japanese Association of Amer
ed Coun(Unit
Kai
Kanji
i
Nikka
ku
Renra
Kai
njin
Zaibci Nippo
ica.);
Amer
North
in
s
iation
Assoc
cilors' Convention for Japanese
Men's
Army
ial
Imper
nese
(Japa
Dan
n
Gunji
ku
'reiko
Nanka
Corps of Southern California);
Utilication
Jugo Haibutsu Riyodan (Behind the Gun Waste
Society) ;
;
Josho Kai (Ever Victorious or Invincible Society)
;
vists)
Reser
Hinodo Kai (Imperial Japanese
ve Officers'
Hokubei Za.igo Shokuin Dan (North American Reser
Association) ;
Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society) ;
);
Suiko Kai (Los Angeles Reserve Officers' Association
ration
Gene
d
Secon
the
ting
Educa
of
ety
(Soci
Kai
Zaibei lkuei
in America) ;
izations.
-Japanese Directory of Political and Religious Organ

Monthly contributions of one dollar or more were
f
made to the Imperial Japanese AI.my War Relie
Fund.
The Japanese Association of America (Nipponjin
Kai) was the principal liaison between the Japanese
organizations in the United States and the Japanese

columns 6 and
The New World Swn, August 28, 1937, pageat4,San
Francisco,
hed
publis
aper
newsp
10. (Japanese language
California.)
18
New World Sun, July 18, 1937, page 3, column 1.
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trol over the conduct of other Japanese throughout the State. * * * With integrated organizations such as these exercising such complete control over the conduct of all Japanese in the State,
it is quite evident that it would be extremely easy
for those at the top to direct the Japanese
throughout the State and wherever located in a
widespread simultaneous campaign of sabotage
which could carry the most serious consequences."
(Tolan Committee Hearings, Part 29, Warren,
p. 10980.)
B. Indoctrination of American Japanese in Japan.

For over twenty-five year!> children of alien J apanese have been sent to Japan by_ their parents for
education.l 0 IUpon their return they were lmown as
"Kibei".
These young American Japanese were
thoroughly indoctrinated with the Japanese nationalistic philosophy. 17 Of the Kibei in Hawaii, Andrew

l_

16 The Court will take
judicial notice of this fact. See Chun
Kock Quon v. Proctor, 92 Fed. (2d) 326, 330.
"Many of them returned to Japan with their family at a
young age and returned to America in their late teens."
Testimony of Henry Tani, Executive Secretary, JapaneseAmerican Citizens League. (Tolan Committee Hearings, Part
29, p. 11150.)
17 Joscph C. Grew, Report from Tokyo, Simon
& Schuster, N.Y.,
1942:
"In Japan the training of youth for ,var is not simply
military training. It is shaping-a warping, if you will--of
the mind of youth from the earliest years. Every Japanese
school child on national holidays goes to his school and takes
part in a ritual intended to impress on him his duties to the
state and to the Emperor. Several times each year every
child is taken with the rest of bis schoolmates to a place
where the spirits of dead soldiers arc enshrined. Tho military
aspect of the state is, and has been for many years, stressed
above all other functions of government. Of the state's duty
to the individual, or of the individual rights and liberties, the
Japanese youth hears nothing. Of his obligation to servo the
state, especially through military service, ho hears every
day." (p. 61.)

I

19
W. Lind, Professor of Sociology at the University
of Hawaii, says:
"Finally, there is the rather large Kibei group
of the second generation who, although citizens
of the United States by virtue of birth within
the Territory, are frequently more fanatically
Japanese in their disposition than their own parents. Many of these individuals have returned
from Japan so recently as to be unable to speak
the English language and some are unquestionably disappointed by the lack of appreciation
ma.nifested for their Japanese education.' 718
At one time it was estimated that there were about
50,000 American-born Japanese in Japan. The Kibei
Shimin movement, sponsored by -the Japanese Association of America,. was organized to encourage their
retmn to America. It appears that this campaign
was successful in securing the return of a large nmnber of American-born Japanese. 10
18 Amcrican Council Paper No.
5, page 187, American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations; 129 Enst 52nd Street, New York.
• 0 Tolan Committee Hearings, Part 29, Warren, p. 10978. The
Hawaiian (Honolulu) Sentinel, Jan. 27, 1938, reported the special
representative of this movement, Shiro Fukioka, General Secretary of tho Los Angeles Japanese Chamber of Commerce, as
saying:
"Thero are roughly about 20,000 American-born youths
between the ages of 18 and 25 residing now in Japan. Being
high school graduates, they arc well versed with the conditions and things of Japanese and would make ideal immigrants to North America. 11 ( Un-American Activities in California, Report of Joint Fact-Finding Committee on UnAmerican Activities in California to California Legislature,
1943.)
During 1941 alone, 1573 Kibei entered west coast ports from
Japan, and 1147 Issei, or alien Japanese, reentered the United
States from Japan. The 557 male Japanese less than twenty-five
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Speaking of the American-born Japanese educated
in Japan, Gove1110rEarl Warren, then Attorney General of California, after a survey by the law enforcement officers of the State, said in his testimony before
the Tolan Committee:
'' I want to say that the consensus of opinion
among the law-enforcement officers of this State
is that there is more potential danger among the
group of Japanese who are born in this country
than from the alien Japanese who were born in
Japan. * * * There has been practically no
migration to this cow1try since 1924. But in
some instances the children of those people have
been sent to Japan for their education, either in
whole or in part, and while they are over there
they are indoctrinated with the idea of Japanese
imperialism. They receive their religious instruction which ties up their religion with their Emperor, and they come back here imbued with the
ideas and the policies of Imperial Japan. mo
0. Significance of the Issei.

I.
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Approximately two-thirds of the persons of J apanese ancestry residing in the Pacific Coast States are
native born citizens (Nisei) and one-third are aliens
(Issei) ineligible for citizenship. 20 • (Ozawa v. Un£ted
years of age who entered west coast ports from Japan during
1941 had an average age of 18.2 years and had spent an average
of 5.2 years in Japan. Of these, 239 had spent more than tl1rcc
years there. This latter group had spent an avera~e of 10.2 years
in Japan. Of the returning Japanese, more than 50% had a close
relative in Japan.-Derivcd
from Ships' Manifests filed at the
San Francisco, Seattle and Los Angeles Port Offices of the Federal Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of
Justice.
20 Tolan Committee hearings,
Part 29, San Francisco, p. 11014.
20 •1940 Census of the United
States (16th), Population, 2nd
Series ( Department of Commerce, pp. 50, 52, 61).
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States, 260 U. S. 178 (1922).) However, in considering this fact for the purpose of evaluating the reasonableness of·th~ group evacuation, these figures do not
present the true significance of the relationship of the
Japanese aliens to American-born Japanese.
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Because of the late date of Japanese entrance into
this country and the exclusion of Japanese immigration in 1924,20 b the foreign-born Japanese represent
the bulk of the adult J apanase population on the
Pacific Coast. This situation is graphically presented
in Chart No. 4,. opposite. Thus it appears that the
foreign-born Japanese are almost entirely enemy
aliens and that the citizens of the gl'Oup are peculiarly
subject to their influence. rrhe median age of the
native born is 17½ years, while that of the foreignborn is 50 years. 90o/oof the 71,484 native-born Japanese in the Pacific Coast States are under the age of
28 years. 49,186 are under the age of 21 years. 20 • 'l'his
breakdown of the age groups shows that the evacuation in most cases had to be accomplished with refer~Ob!mmigration Law of 1924, 8 U.S.C. 213. The feeling of
separateness and implied racial inferiority engendered by this
Act was one of the factors to be judicially noted in deciding the
instant case, according to Denman, C. J.:
"These facts are entitled to be considered with reference
to the likelihood of disaffection among a class so treated,
in determining General DcWitt's regulations for exclusion
of dangerous people from the war areas bordering the
Pacific. • • • Neither General DeWitt nor this court is
concerned with the political or social justification of this
stigma on the Mongolian, but both are concerned with its
effect on proud spirited people so branded by the Congress."
-Upon Certification of Questions to this Court, United
States v. Ilirabayashi (CCA-9, No. 10,308), p. 28.
200 Unpublished information
furnished by Census Bureau of
United States.
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ence to family groups rather than upon an individual
basis.

ciety for Education of the Second Generation in
America) was organized in April, 1940, less than two
years before the attack on Pearl Harbor. 'l'he purposes of this organization were stated as follows:
"With the grace of the Emperor, the Zaibei
Ikeui Kai is being organized in commemoration of the 2,600th Anniversary of the Founding
of the Japanese Empire to J apanize the second
and third generations in this country for the accomplishment of establishing a greater Asia in
the future * * *. 1121

The enforced alienage of the Issei has caused them
to retain a close relationship with the Japanese Government through the consulates. Because of their
mature years and their control of the wealth of the
Japanese communities, they control Japanese business
establishments and agricultural groups 20 d and dominate the many Japanese organizations (supra, p.
200
rrhe parent-child relationship which exists
12).
between the Japanese aliens and the native bo1n is
significant because great importance
particularly
is given to filial obligations in Japanese family life.201
D. Japanese LanguageSchoolB.

.An additional pro-Japanese influence among American-born Japanese were the Japanese language schools
on the Pacific Coast. To assist in the J apanization
of the second generation, the Zaibei Ikeui Kai (So20

dTolan Committee Preliminary Report, p. 302.
•Statement of Togo Tanaka, Editor of English Section of
Rafu Shimpo, Japanese daily newspaper published in Los Angeof California Legislative Committee on
les, Culiforniu.-Report
.Un-American Activities in California, 1943. l\1r. Tanaka stated
that: "The older generation, or pro-Japanese group, influenced the
thinking of the younger Nissei generation on the matter of the
Sino-Japanese war. This accounted for tho Nissei 's activity in
propagandizing· the Japanese cause against China. 'l'he Issci
influence was very ·strong in this connection. 'l'he Nissei hnd
been taught that the Japanese were embarking on a great military crusade in China and building a new order in the Far
East.'' Tanaka believed that the Nissci had been drawn into this
ideological position because of emotional tics and that the younger
r:;cneration of American-born Japanese found it impossible to
become objective in face of their ,parents' prcjudice.-Report, pp.
333-334.
201
The Court will take judicial notice of social and economic
•
conditions. Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 173 (1941)..
20

In California alone there were 248 of these schools,
with a total student body of 17,800 and an aggregate
faculty of 454.22 Apparently the text books used were
edited by the Department of Education of the
Japanese Imperial Government.
rrhe purpose of The Buddhist J apa:nese Language
School is to teach not only the Japanese language, but
also t'o indoctrinate Japanese spirit as well as Buddhism. 'fhis school was founded April 19, 1903. There
were about 35 Buddhist language schools and 4900
pupils. Some of the graduates of _these language
schools were selected to go to Japan and study J apanese education. 22 •
1'he Hokubei •Butoku Kai, (Military :Virtue Society in North .A1n.erica) was founded on September
27, 1929. Since that time, this Society has spread all
New World Sun, April 13, 1940, page 4, column 1.
Zaibei Nippon Zin Shi, History of the Japanese in America,
Pt. II, Ch. 6, p. 483. (Published in Tokyo in Japanese, 1940.
Translation.)
• 22 a1bid., Part II, Chap. 5, ip. 422.
21

22
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over the West Coast. In 1940, it had 41 branches and
more than 10,000 members. 'Since 1932, this Society
has opened summer schools for military virtue and
organized second generation Mother Country Militia
1
.rraining Corps. This Corps selected 14 memhers and
sent them to Japan for their education. Since then,
every year Mother Country Visiting Militia 11.'raini.ng
Corps have been sent to 'Japan and in an endeavor
to absorb Japanese culture. 22b
E. Dual Oitizewihip.

The theory of the Japanese Government that persons of Japanese ancestry, although bon1 in America,
may also possess Japanese citizenship has been a barrier to ,the Americanization of the J apanese. 28 As
pointed out in the Report of the Tolan Committee:
"Two barriers to Americanization ·of the Japanese have long existed: First, the Exclusion Act
by which the alien parents were denied citizenship; and second, the dual citizenship of Japanese
born in the United States or its Territories and
possessions. The former barrier has thrown the
alien back :upon the Japanese Govemment,
through the operations of .the consulates. This
relationship has been reenforced by the presence
22hJbid., Part II, Chap. 8, p. 564.
23 is estimated that 32 per cent of the Nisei-second generalt
tion-born in America hold Japanese citizenship, but this figure
includes those who are not certain if they have this status. Statement by executive secretary, S. F. chapter of Japanese-American
Citizen League, Tolan Committee Hearings, p. 11151.
Act XX-2 of the Japanese Nationality Law of 1924 requires
a declaration of intention to retain Japanese nationality for peri;ons horn after 1924. A person born prior to 1924 may relinquish
Japanese nationality. Sec Imperial Ord. No. 261, Act III and
Ord. No. 262.

..

w

25

on the west coast of large n-z£mbersof mercantile
establishments and banlcs tying the com1nercial
groups in the J apanese-Aniericam community to
Japan. 'l.'his in turn has led to the practice of
sending children to · J apam to be edticated in
prepwration,.:ifor trade and banking. Thus, the
leadership of the business community has fallen
to those in close touch with the homeland and to
their children whose education and commercial
position has directed them toward the maintenance of dual citizenship. Communities of J"apan~se farmers have been more free of these influences, but the need to secure financing of their
crops has combi11;edwith strong peasant ties of
language and kinship to keep these rural people
in touch with Japan." 21 *

i
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F. Emperor Worship-Shintoism.

The fact that a number of American citizens of
Japanese ancestry participate in the worship of the
Emperor of Japan must also be considered in judging
loyalties. This worship, lmown as the cult of Shinto,
looks upon the Emperor of Japan and his ancestors
as deities and thus joins, in one, political iand religious loyalty. The aims and purposes of the State
of Japan become the faith of the adherents of
Shinto.25 While there is an indication that Shintoism
is not so widely practiced among second generation
American Japanese as among their alien parents, the
younger generation participate in the rites of Em2 • Preliminary Report and Recommendations. These recommendations were approved in the Final Report of the Committee (H.R.
No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 1942, p. 11).
•Except as hcroinaftcr indicak-<l, emphasis is added.
: 5D. C: Holton, The National Faith of Japan (1938).
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peror worship as an expression of national spirit and
racial solidarity. 20

Islands,21 Malaya, the Philippines, Burma and tlie
Netherlands East Indies.
'fhat the Japanese Oil the Pacific Coast, citizen and
alien, are recognized by _the Japanese Government as
potential agents to assist the Japanese army, navy
and air force is revealed in the unabridged translation of the book '"I1he Three Power Alliance and a
United States-Japanese War", 28 published in 1940
in Tokyo by Kinoaki Matsuo, an officer in the J apanese Naval Intelligenc~. Speaking of the expected
use to be made of Japanese in aid of an invasion of
Southern California, Matsuo says:
"The ~limate being ideal, San Pedro is an exceptionally good harbor; there are many J"apanese subjects in that area engaged in fishery."
(p. 143.)

G. The Prospect of a Fifth Column.

The facts just reviewed indicate that because of
the racial, cultural, religious and ideological ties and
sympathies with J"apan and the various causes which
have kept the J"apanese apart, there would be a sufficient number that could be used as a fifth column in
assisting in sabotage or espionage or giving aid in
the ·event of an attempted attack. 2 0& Recent history
shows that the J"apanese made use of military infor.
mation gathered by J"apanese living in the Hawaiian
28
For example, on February 11, 1940, the Japanese Association
.of Sacramento sponsored an Emperor worshipping ceremony in
commemoration of tho 2600th anniversary of the founding of
Japan. 3000 attended.
Another group met on January 1, 1941, at Lindsay, California, to honor the 2601st year of the founding of the Japanese
Empire, participated in the annual reverence to the l~mpcror, and
bowed their heads toward Japan in order to indicate that they
would be "• • • ready to respond to the call of the mother
country with one mind. Japan is fighting to curry out our program of Greater Asiatic co-prosperity. Our fellow Japanese
countrymen must be of one spirit and should endeavor to unite
our Japanese societies in this country • • •." 'l'he program was ns
follows:
a. Singing of Japanese National Anthem.
b. Opening of the Emperor's portrait.
c. Reading of the Emperor's Rescript.
d. Reading of Message of Reverence.
e. Bowing hca<ls toward Japan.
f. Shouting "Banzai" (Long Live the Emperor).
(New World Sun, January 7, 1941, page 5, column 6.)
26
•The fact that the Hawaiian Islands "because of their position and the inclusion in their population of so large an element
presumptively alien in sympathy are peculiarly exposed to fifth
column activities" .was judicially noticed in Zimmerman v.
Walker, 132 Fed. (2d) 442, 446 (1943).
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And of the Japanese in Hawaii, he writes:
"* * * If a false step is made it might give
rise to a regrettable incident such as a great
massacre * * * but they will be of great help
when a landing is made by our army. * * *"
(p. 296.)
;;
27 Rcport

of the Commission appointed by the PreBident of
the United States to ·investigate and report the facts relating to
the attack made by Japancso armed forces upon Pearl Harbor.
,Justiel\ Robert's Report, pages 12-13, Sen. Doc. No. 159; 77th
Cong. 2nd Sess.
The use of the fifth column technique in modern warfare may
he judicially noticed. {Ex parte Liebmawn (1916), 1 K.B. 268,
274-5, 278.)
28 1'/ie Three Power Alliance and a United States-Japanese War,
Kinoaki Matsuo (1940); translation by Kilsoo K. Haan, How
Japan flans to Win, Little-Brown & Co., Boston (1942).
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Within the Pacific Coast areas in which persons of
Japanese ancestry were concentrated there are numerous military and naval establishments as well as public utilities, shipyards, airplane factories and thousands of other industries essential to the war effort.
One-third of the nation's war planes and one-fourth
the country's ships are being built on the Pacific
....,j!
..i.st. These and other important factories are located in the Puget Sound Area of Washington and
in the vicinity of the metropolitan areas of Portland,
Oregon, and !San Francisco, Los :Angeles and San
Diego, California. 2 ° From these ports men and materials move to the broad Pacific battle areas. Seattle
is the principal port in the northwest from which
troops and materials to Alaska are supplied. Within
this metropolitan area are located the vital aircraft
and shipbuilding plants of the northwest-the Bremerton Navy yard, the Boeing aircraft factories, and
fflfne of the most vital shipbuilding ways of the nation.
•'·hin this same area was concentrated most of the
Japanese of the northwest, as depicted by ·Chart 7,
App. page ii.

L

The San Francisco area is one of the great ports
for the Pacific Coast It is invaluable to the Anny and
Navy. The Mare Island Navy Yard, the Hunter's
A reference to the spot map (Chart 3, opp. p. 11), showing
the disposition of the Japanese population, pictures the high concentration of persons of Japanese ancestry in the Pacific Coast
20

area.

"This court can take judicial notice of the extensive manufacturing facilities for airplanes and other munitions of· war
which are located on .or near om~ west coast.'' (Ex partc Kanai,
46 Fed. Supp. 286, 288 (D.C., E.D., Wisc., July 29, 1942.)

Point docks, the San Francisco and Golden Gate
bridges, the Kaiser and Marinship and numerous
other shipyards, the Permdnente magnesium mill are
but a few of the important }Jlants. Chart No. 8, App.
iii presents the picture of the concentration of J apanese in this area.
Metropolitan Los Angeles is one of the greatest
aircraft centers of the world including the great Douglas, Lockheed, Vega, and Bendix factories. Other defense plants nwnber into the many hundreds. There
should be superimposed on this scene the picture presented by Chart 9, App. p_ageiv, showing the concentration of J apaoose in the Los Angeles Metropolitan
Area. This shows that Terminal Island, with the
nearby Navy shipyards, air fields and harbor facilities,
was occupied almost exclusively by Japanese. ( Chart
9, App. page iv.) 80
Of scarcely secondary importance is the protect.ion
of the lumber industry of Washington, Oregon and
California. The large area devoted to this industry .
afforded saboteurs unlimited freedom of action. '11he
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29, San Francisco Hearings Tolan Committee. Included
in Exhibit B, p. 10988, is a letter dated February 19, 1942, from
C. B. Horrall, Chief of Police of Los Angeles, to the Attorney
General of California, in which it is stated:
"It is my opinion that the danger, especially for fifthcolumn activities in this district, is serious. This is due to the
fact that thcro arc some twenty-five to thirty thousand Japanese in this area and the location of a lnrge portion of theso
are in very strategic areas. These strategic nreas are in the
very close proximity of the coastal regions where an invasion
party would necessarily be landed. I have no doubt that they
would lend any and all assistance possible to a Japanese land
invasion, and several of the Japanese who are believed to be
as patriotic as any, have expressed the above opinion in interviews." (p. 10989.)
30 Part
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The Attorney General of the State of California,
with the assistance of the law enforcement authorities
of the State, examined the location of persons of
Japanese ancestry with reference to strategic military
._·installations and defense premises. His report concluded:
"It shows that along the coast from Marin
County to tlie Mexican border virtually every
important strategic location and instaHation has
one or more Japanese in its immediate vicinity.
The same situation exists in those counties of the
Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys that have
80

•Tolan Committee JI earings, Part .30, p. 11501.
81
The possibility of infiltration by en~my agents was forcefully
brought to this Court's attention in the facL'i which it studied in
connection with the landing of German saboteurs on the Long
Island and Florida Coasts. ('Ex 1>arteQuirin, U.S. Sup. Ct. Oel.
29, 1942; 87 L.Ed. 1.)
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danger from forest fires involved not only the destruction of valuable timber but also threatened cities, towns
and other installations in the affected area. Mr. Smith
Troy, Attorney General of the State i0f Washington
in his statement to the Tolan Committee declared that
the protection of the lumber resources of the State presented tremendous difficulties in view of the possibility
of sabotage, and that lumber was a vitally important
defense material needed in the construction 1ofships
30
and camps. • The entire coastal strip from Cape Flattery south to Lower California is particularly import1
ant from a protective viewpoint. 1 here are numerous
naval installations and the coastline is particularly
vulnerable. Distances between inhabited areas are
great and enemy. activities might be carried on without interference. 81
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COAST OUTLINE OF SANTA BARBARA COUNTY

Santa Barbara County
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The Santa Ynez Valley, equally as fertile as the
Santa Maria Valley, but containing no strategic points,
has no Japanese living within it.

Near Santa Barbara, the United States lighthouse is
completely surrow1dcd by Japanese-occupied lands.
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'l'he Santa Marin, El Capitan, Goleta and Summerland oil fields are surrounded by or adjacent to Japa.
nese occupied lands. Such lands arc also in close
proximity to the Santa Barbara airport, gas storage
plants, gus lines, main railroad line, main highway and
a radio broadcasting station (shelled by Japanese
submarine).

%
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In the city of Santa Maria, Japanese-owned land is
adjacent to the principal San Francisco-Los Angeles
telephone lines, power lines, water works and Pacific
Coast highway.
Japanese lands near Lompoc cover the only entrance
to Camp Cook. Because of the nature of the terrain,
the Japanese could block the entrance to this military
reservation.

~
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Thus if the Japanese located on the aforementioned
lands acted in unison, they could destroy railroad and
highway communications, telephone connections, gas
plants, four oil fields, a ligl1t house and a radio station.
They could assist an enemy landing on the coast.
(For further details see Tolan Committ~e Hearings,
Part 29, pp. 10985-10986.)
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The beach at the north end of the county, upon
which Japanese-are living, is entirely open to landing.

31

An illustration is presented in the accompanying
Chait 5, opposite, together with the excerpt from the
report of the, District Attorney of Santa Barbara
Comity, showing the situation in his comity.
In the San Diego area a number of our most important aircraft manufacturing plants are located as
well as Army and Navy installations and public utilities needed for their operations. The accompanying
Chart 6, opposite page 32, of San Diego County shows
some of the particular points where Japanese were
immediately adjacent to these important installations.
I. Internal Security Threatened by Anti-Ja.pa.neseDisturbances.

•

Because of the growing bitterness of war, together
with the basis for suspicion due to the characteristics
of the Japanese population on the Pacific Coast, just
reviewed, it was reasonable for the Commanding General to anticipate that the continued presence of J apanese in Pacific Coast military areas would present a
constant threat of anti-Japanese disturbances. This
would endanger the inte111al security of the area.
'rherefore it was necessary, in order to preserve internal security as well as to protect the Japanese
themselves, t.o remove them from Pacific Coast military zones.118
32 Statemcnt hy Hon. Earl Warren, Attorney General of the
State of California, before Tolan Committee. (Part 29, San Francisco Hearings.)
38 "Even from the small areas that they have left up to the
prffient time there are many, many Japanese who are now roaming
around the State and roaming around the Western States in a
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any considerable Japanese population, and in
San Bernardino, Riverside, and Imperial Counties. ,,02
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Based upon his contact with the prosecuting attorneys of the State of Washington, the State Attorney General, the Honorable Smith Troy, related to the
Tolan Committee that:
'' During the past several weeks, there has been
a growing concern among all prosecutors about
the possibility of mob violence against both citizens and alien Japanese which might flare up as
a result of severe war casualties or other inflaming incidents of the war.' ,saa
Thus it is seen that there was a real and present
danger of attack or invasion and that among the
112,000 persons of Japanese ancestry within the Pacific Coast States there was reason to believe that
there were a considerable number of American-Japanese who were potentially disloyal and, because of
their location, were capable of conducting espionage
for the enemy and committing sabotage to war plants
and utilities in a way which might have had disastrous consequences for the Pacific Coast and have
seriously interfered with America's success in its war
with Japan. We now consider the action which was
taken to meet this military problem.

m

THE AOTION TAKEN.

To meet the pressing and serious situation on the
Pacific Coast and to authorize action with reference
to other persons whose presence was deemed dangerous to the defense of military areas, President Roose. condition that will unquestionably bring nbout race riots and
prejudice and hysteria and excesses of all kind." (Tolan Committee Hearings, Warren, Part 29, p. 11015.)
88 •Tolan Committee Hearings, Seattle Pt.
30, p. 11503.
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COAST OUTLINE OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY
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Near naval ammunition depot, Marine Corps base,
naval training station, Fort Rosecrans military reservation, destroyer base, naval supply depot and Coast
Guard depot.
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Adjacent to water wells, pumps, lines and dams
supplying water to military reservations and the
county.
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Adjacent to Camp Callan and power lines supplying
the Camp and San Diego.
In the vicinity of Solar Aircraft,· Rohr Aircraft,
Ryan Airplane and three Consolidated Aircraft plants.
Adjacent to Navy Airport at Ream Field, Army Airport at Border l<,icldand San Diego Municipal Airport.
(For further details see Tolan Committee Hearings,
Part 29, pp. 10984-10985.)
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p. 3) were established as a matter of military necessity.
Military Area No. 1, as then defined, included approximately the western half of Washington, Oregon and
California and the southern half of Arizona 3 G and still
coincides approximately with the Army's Pacific Com1
bat Zone. '1he proclamation then stated that such
persons or classes of persons as the situation required
would be excluded from all of Military Area No. 1 and
from certain zones in Area No. 2. By Proclamation
No. 2 (March 16, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 2405) other prohibited zones within Area No. 2 were established under
similar conditions. See Chart 1, opposite page 3.
The War Relocation Authority was e.stablished on
March 18, 1942, by Presidential Executive Order
80
9102 "in order to provide for the removal from
designated areas of persons whose removal is necessary in the interests of national security". The Authority was authorized to formulate and effect a program for the removal from the areas of persons designated under Executive Order 9066 and to provide
"for their relocation, maintenance, and supervision".

any act in any prescribed military area or zone contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any
der, provided such person
'
designated militar.}_comman
knew or should have lmown of the restrictions or
orders and that his act was in violation thereof. 87
By Proclamation No. 3 (March 24, 1942, 7 Fed.
Reg. 2543), curfew hours were established for all
persons of Japanese ancestry, and all alien enemies
in Military Area No. 1 and certa.in zones in Military
Area No. 2. This is the order which appellant was
found to have violated under ·Count II of the indictment. (Tr. 2-3.)
•
'
Ily Public Proclamation No. 4 (March 27, 1942, 7
Fed. Reg. 2601), General DeWitt prohibited enemy
aliens and all persons of Japanese ancestry from leaving Military Area No. 1 after March 29, 1942, until
further notice. Thereafter a series of Civilian Exclusion Orders were issued by which all persons of
J apru1ese ancestry, both alien and non-alien except
in special cases, were excluded from all portions of
Military Area No. 1 and certain portions of Military
Area No. 2.
The appellant, residing within Military Area No. 1,
was ordered excluded under Civilian Exclusion Order
•No. 57, dated May 10, 1942. (Tr. 1-2.)
On June 8, 1942, Proclamation No. 7 (7 Fed. Reg_.
3062), 1·eferring to the Civilian Exclusion Orders by
which all iIJersons of Japanese ancestry were excluded

With Proclamations 1 and 2 and Executive Order
9066 before it, Congress, in order to provide for enforcement in the Federal Criminal Courts of the orders issued under the· Executive Order, on March 21,
1942, enacted Public Law 503 (77th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
Ch. 191). This Act declared it to be a misdemeanor
for anyone to enter, remain in or leave or commit
3GBeeausethe military situation no longer required it, the area
in the State of Arizona prohibited to person~ of Japanese ancestry
hy Proclamation No. 1 has been reduced. (Proclamation No. 16,
March 17, 1943, 8 Fed. 1kg. 3256.)
36
U.S.C. Cong. Ser. No. 3, p. 265 (1942).

1·

"BF.: IT ENACTED BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF
HEPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED, That whoever shall enter,
remain in, leave or commit any act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive Order of
37
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from portions of Military Area No. 1, declared that
Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt, pursuant to the
authority vested in him by the President of the
United States and by the Secretary of War and under
his powers as Commanding General, ratified the
Civilian Exclusion Orders and excluded all persons
of Japanese ancestry from ali portions of Military
Area No. 1.

Coast when the curfew and evacuation orders were
issued in March a,nd in May, 1942-a period when
the Japanese were ~t the height of their military fortunes. (Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (1851).)
In passing upon the •group exclusion, judgment
should not ,be ba~d on conditions as they now exist
n year after the exclusions were ordered and when
the dangers have somewhat subsided, although the
possibility of raids remains and precautions against
sabotage and espionage must be maintained until the
war 1s over.
It is clear that t~e exclusion was considered entirely
a.s a matter of militarY] necessity and that no foundation exists for any claim that the action of the President or Commanding General was the result of a public clamor born of old prejudices. 88
If it cannot be said that group exclusion was not an
unreasonable method with which to meet the emer-

A. The curfew and exclUBionorders, applied on a group basis
within the military areas, were conceived in good faith in the
face of emergency and were directly related to the mission
of the Commanding General in defending the Pacific Coast
and preventing sabotage and espionage.

•

The need for action being clear, and the authority
to exclude persons from military areas having been
granted, the remaining consideration concerns the propriety of excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry
as a group from the military area and imposing curfew
as an incident thereto. In judging the reasonableness of dealing with the problem upon a group basis,
the three Pacific Coast States appearing here as amici
curiae believe that it is .of the utmost importance for
the members of the Court to judge the good faitli
and validity of the Commanding General's action in
the light of the facts as they existed on the Pacific
the President, by the Secretary of War, or.bv any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the
restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to
the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of
the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his
act was in violation thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed $5,000 or to
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for each
offense." (77th Cong., 2nd Sess., Ch. 191.)

1·

__
,,_.__,

38 "What
arguments were presented to the President by the
military authorities of this district have not been made known,
\mt to assume that General DeWitt, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Anny and Naval Intellip;cnce were motivated by
race prejudice, greed for land, or popular hysteria, as this letter
calmly docs, is just silly. And, it was the arguments of this group
that plainly impressed the President.
'' Ono has but to recall tho original objections of the administration, as voiced by Attorney General Biddle, to removal of tho
Japs, to realize that it was not popular clamor that influenced the
President, but very cogent evidence submitted by the military
command. 1'he implication that the President would be swayed by
1·uceprejudice, greed, or hysteria is no compliment. His instincts
are in the other direction. • • • The exclusion was a military
me.1sure and was recognized as such, and as necessary, by the
Japanese themselves, who submitted to it • • •. These Japanese
knew that there were traitors to the United States in their midst
and further that complete identification of all of them was impossibly difficult."-An editorial on the proposal of the Post-War
Council's plea to President Roosevelt to revoke evacuation orderLos Angeles Times, May 19, 1942.

---
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gency, th.e Court will uot substitute its judgment for
that of the military commander. As this Court said in
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909), speaking
through Mr. Chief Justice Holmes:
"When it comes to a decision by the head of the
State upon a matter involving its life, the ordin~ry rights of individuals must yield to what he
deems the necessities of the moment. Public
danger warrants the substitution of executive
process for judicial process. See Kelly v. Sanders, 99 U.S. 441, 446. This was admitted with
regard to killing men in the actual clash "{)farms,
and we think it obvious, although it was disputed,
that the same is true of temporary detention to
prevent apprehended harm,. * * *" (p. 85.)

There were many among those excluded who were
undoubtedly loyal-some of them are now proudly
wearing the .American uniform. But in the light of
the military situation (supra, page 9) and the
characteristics of the Japanese population on the
Pacific Coast as a whole '(supra, page 11), there
was undoubtediy reason to believe that, among this
g-roupof over 112,000 JJeople possessing strong racial
and cultural ties with the enemy, there was enough
potential disloyalty, which could not be sifted by administrative hearings in sufficient time, to justify the
removal of the danger within the group by the removal
of the group as a whole.

Similarly, this precept will apply when the President through his military commanders excludes persons from vital military areas to prevent apprehended
harm.
The scope of the powers of the President in time
of war, acting as Commander-in-Chief, were thus described in Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493 (1870):
"The President is the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy, and of the militia of the several States, when called into service of the United
States, and it is made his duty to take care that
the laws are faithfully executed. Congress is authorized to make all laws necessary and proper
to carry into effect the granted powers; The
measures to be taken in carrying on war and to
suppress insurrection are not defined. The decision of all such questions rests wholly in the dis- •
cretion of those to whom the substantial powers
involved are confided by the Constitution. In the
.

!

Although adhering to the majority dictum in Ex
parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866), as to the occasion
when a military commander may exercise control over
civilians, tlie trial Court in United States v. Yasui 89
recognized that in view of the situation on the Pacific
Coast, persons of Japanese ancestry, aliens and citizens alike, represented a reasonable classification for
the regulations issued:
"The conditions and necessities of preparation
for modern -war had previously been recognized

80 Now

.

~

\

....

before this Court, Yasui v. United State11,No. 871.

Reproduced at the National Archives at Seattle

latter case the power is not limited to victories
in the field and the dispersion of the insurgent
forces. It canies with it inherently the power
to guard against the immediate renewal of the
conflict, and to remedy the evils which have
arisen from its rise and progress.'' (pp. 506-507.)
,

40

41,

-

The emergence of a substantial group of the supporters of Japan among the persons of Japanese ancestry at the Manzanar Relocation Center 40 resulting
in serious riot and bloodshed substantiates the belief
of the military authorities that there were potentially

0

Excerpt from news report in San Francisco ( California) CallBulletin, December 7, 1942:
"MANZANAR, Dec. 7 (AP). A pro-Axis celebration of
the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor caused a riot in the Japanese relocation center here last night and troops called to
restore order -fired several shots into the surging mob, killing
one Japanese and wounding nine.
Ralph P. Merritt, project director, said the rioting started
Saturday night when Japanese loyal to America interfered
with a meeting called by the KiLci, anti-American group.
Merritt called for military assistance and the disturbance was
quelled .
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Last night the factions began fighting and soon there we1:C
4,000 in a milling crowd. Shouts of 'Pearl Harbor, Banzai!
Banzai!' had precipitated a free-for-all. ~ • •"

disloyal elements in considerable numbers among Pacific Coast J·apanese. 0
rl'he subsequent declaration of loyalty for Japan
by twenty-folll' per cent of American Japanese of
draft age is a further indication of the existence of
HExccrpt from editorial in Seattle (Washington) Post-Intelligencer, December 9, 1942:
"Riots staged by anti-American Japanese in Arizona nnd
California camps lead to two conclusions. One is that the
Army moved none too soon in its general evacuation of Japanese from coastal areas. • • •"
Excerpt from editorial in Los Angeles (California) Timcs,
December 9, 1942:
"Events at the Japanese centers at Manzanar nnd at
Poston, Arizona, prove up to· the hilt the necessity of Gen.
DeWitt 's order clearing all persons of Japanese ancestry out
of the Pacific Const military areas. The evacuation order, it
will be remembered, was roundly criticized by uniformed
Rastcrners and by some Westerners who should have known
better. It is now clear that the feeling of too many Japanese
was entirely unfriendly to the United States, and that considerable members of Japanese born here were included in
the unfriendly group. Por the safety of the Japanese themselves-and the safety of Japanese loyal to the United States
at least was entitled to protcction-tJ1e evacuation was wise
and necessary."
Excerpt from editorial in Long Beach (California) PressTelegram of December 8, 1942:
'' 'l'hc riot furnished a sufficient answer to those who have
been questioning the wisdom of the Army's isolation of
Japanese inhabitants of this country. All Japanese were
moved away from potential war zones along the coast and
placed under guard in-camps of the interior for the good and
sufficient reason that some of them were dangerous to the
United States when this nation and Japan were involved in
war, and n9body could tell certainly which of the Japanese
were loyal to America and which were enemies at heart.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

'fhe violent demonstration by pro-Axis Japanese ut Manzunar does not provide the evidence whereby a complete separation of the sheep and the goats can be made, but it docs
prove beyond any doubt that a considerable percentage of the
Japanese in this big relocation camp are loyal to Japan and
consequently are enemies of the United Stutes."
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by this court. The areas and zones outlined in
the proclamations became a theatre of operations
subjected in localities to attack and all threatened'
during this period with a full scale invasion. The
danger at the time this prosecution was instituted
was imminent and immediate. The difficulty of
controlling members of an alien race, many of
whom, although citizens, were disloyal with opportunities of sabotage and espionage, with invasion imminent, presented a problem requiring
for solution ability and devotion of the highest
order." (U.S.D.C., D. of Ore., No. 16056; Tr.
18-19.)

•~r~\~·-

-""\:,

a disloyal attitude toward America. 42 It is a speculation that such an expression for Japan would have
been forthcoming at a hearing which would have had
for its purpose the determining of whether or not the
individual should remain in a Pacific Coast Military
Area. The possibility that the disloyal elements would
have been disclosed through the holding of individual
hearings is, at least, sufficiently doubtful that it cannot be said that the Commanding General committed
an abuse of discretion when he decided on the more
certain course of removing all disloyal elements by
removing the group as a whole. 48
The apparent reasonableness of the evacuation was
set forth by the Tolan Committee in its report" to
Congress, wherein it declared:
"This committee does not deem its proper province to encompass a judgment on the military
need for the present ( and any subseque'nt) evacuElmcr l\L Rowalt, Deputy Director of the "\Var Relocation
Authority ("\VRA), states that answers to tho War Department's
recruiting questionnaire show that the number of professedly
disloyal Japanese will total about 24% of the military cligihlrs,
ranging from 3% at the Minadoka Center in ldal10 to 52% at
?llanzanar, California. Each of the camps has a population of
about 10,000.-San Francisco Examiner (Wash. Bureau), April
30, 1943.
43 A news article on disloyalty among Japanese at relocation
centers states:
"Many actively subversive alien Japaneso have already been
confined in detention camps, but it is said that fully ns many,
undetected in the first stages of the war, are still mingling in
the centers with Japanese who have been pronounced harmless to date hy military' intelligence and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation." (San Francisco Examiner, dated :May1,
1943.)
HJI.H. No. 1911, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., Murch 19, •1942, pp.
13-14.
42

"\

ation orders. In time of war the military authorities are obligated to take every necessary step
and every precaution to assure the internal safety
of the Nation. The need for these safeguards
appears the more pressing when we consider that
present-day warfare has developed the fifthcolumn technique in unprecedented fashion. It
is naive to imagine that the enemy powers will
not exploit these techniques to the full. The tragic
events of Pearl Harbor have created in the public
mind a consciousness, whatever the character of
the evidence, that the dangers from internal enemies cannot be ignored.'' (p. 13.)
"Various arguments were adduced in testimony
before the committee why the Japanese, both citizen and alien, should be evacuated from the west
coast. Most commonly it was said that homogeneity of racial and cultural traits made it impossible to distinguish between the loyal and the
disloyal. Law enforcement officials were particularly concerned lest enraged public sentiment and
possibly mob action, occasioned by reverses in
the Pacific war theater, would work injury to
innocent and guilty alike. Protection for J apanese residents as well as for the whole Nation
was said to require the immediate evacuation of
all Japanese." (p. 14.)
B. The military commander as a matter of law was entitled to
employ the precautionary and preventive measures of curfew
and exclusion without conducting individual hearings.

One of appellant's principal contentions is that he
and the others evacuated with him were denied due
process because the military authorities should have
conducted individual hearings to detennine the loyalty
of persons to be evacuated. (Tr. p. 41.) As previously
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45

noted the ready answer to this suggestion is that this
Court will not attempt to judge the merits of the
procedtue by which the Commanding General met
the military situation as against another method
w_hich might have been employed. rrhe Court will
have performed its function when it has determined
that the Commanding General acted in good faith and
that the adoption of the method of group evacuation
was within the range of honest judgment which military commanders are allowed in meeting military
problems within their jurisdiction. (Sterling v. Con,.
sta;ntin, 287 U. S. 378 (1932) ;-:Moyer v. Peabod1J,212
U. S. 78 (1909) ; S tewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493
(1870).) •

The Attorney General of California is the chief law
enforcement officer of the State. (Calif. Const., Art. V,
Sec. 21.) rrhe above statement, therefore, representing
the opinion of the law enforcement officers who have
observecl.the Pacific Coast Japanese for many years,
is particularly, significant.
Only a brief· consideration of the task of investigating and holding hearings for 100,000 people will
reveal the difficulties and scope of the task and the
time required. From the matters already discussed it
is evident that there were many pro-Japanese influences which might have offset the loyalty to this
country which otherwise might be assumed to exist.
To judge such an imponderable thing as loyalty in
these cases would call for a consideration of those
influmices and experiences of a lifetime which go to
make up the final spirit and feeling of loyalty to a
country. Now, if the immediate danger has been removed and ti1~e has become available for thorough
investigation, it may be possible to devise an adequate.
test and to separate the loyal from the disloyal. However, this would not mean that General DeWitt, in the
face of the emergency, should have taken the time or
have resolved doubts against employing the precaution
of removing the entire group in order to secure the
safety of the military_ area.• 11
"* * * it can hardly be said to be unreasonable
. to go on the assmpption that among the ,Japanese
communities along the coast there is enough dis-

1

Because the Japanese population has remained
apart from the rest of the people of the Pacific Coast
and because inscrutability is a definite racial characteristic, it was at least doubtful whether any safe
and practical measure for dete1mining prospective
disloyalty could have been employed.
Regarding the lack of, an adequate test, former
Attorney General Earl Warren of California testified
before the Tolan Committee as follows:
"We believe that when we are dealing with the
Caucasian race we have methods that will test
the loyalty of them, and we believe that we can,
in dealing with the Germans and tl1e Italians,
arrive at some fairly sound conclusions because
of our knowledge of t.he way they Jive in the
community and have lived for many years. Buf
when we deal with the ,Tapanese we are in an
entirely different field and we cannot form any
opinion that we believe to be sound. "• 11
• 11
Tola~

Pmnmjtteo

Jlr.n.rjn1TR

P1J.rt.?~ n

1101"

•

48 Recent developments at Relocation
Centers, where admittedly
disloyal elements have revealed themselves, indicate that previous
checks for disloyalty were misleading. (News report, San Frnncisco Examiner, May 1, 1943, supra noto 43.)
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JV, IN TIME OF WAR MAY THE MILITARY AUTHORrrIBS

loyalty, potential if not active, to make it expedient to evacuate the whole. Perhaps ninety-nine
peaceful Japanese plus an miascertainable one
who would signal to a submarine would add up
to a sufficient reason for evacuating. If it were
a matter of punishment, this sort of reasoningwould be :brutal. But no one supposes that evacuation, any more than detention under Regulation
18B in England, is defe;nsible on any -0ther basis
than prevention. When one considers the irreparable consequences to which leniency might lead,
the inconvenience, great though it may be, seems
only one of the unavoidable hardships incident to
the war. In this judgment General DeWitt doubtless acted on such intelligence as was available,
and, it is to be remembered, with the express sanction of the President and the Congress." (Fairman, The Law <>fMart£al Rule a.nd the National
Em,ergency, 55 'Harv. L. R. 1254, 1302 (June,
1942.)

It is the purpose of this section to discuss the gener~l question of the right of military authorities in
time of war to exercise controls, such as curfew and
exclusion, over civilians in the territory of the States.

\

I
•
I

'

One of the prime objects of the Federal Constitution as declared by its preamble is "to provide for
the common defense". 'l'his war power the Constitution divides between the President and Congress. Congress is granted the power to declare war and to provide for the common defense (Art. I, Sec. 8, Cls. 1,
11), to raise and support armies (Art. I, Sec. 8, CL
12), to make 1·ules for the governance of the armed
forces (Art. I, Sec. 8, CL 14), and to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
these powers into execution (Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 18}.
Art. IV, Sec. 4, provides that the United States "shall
protect t.he states against invasion". Upon the declaration of a national war, the administrative task of
protecting the states ag-ainst invasion and conducting
the war to a successful conclusion lies with the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy
and is carried out by him through his Secretary of
War and the duly constituted subordinate military
commanders. (Moyer v~ Peabody, 212 U. S. 78 (1909),
quoted supra, p. 38; Stewart v. l(ahn, 11 Wall. 493
(1870), quoted supra, p. 38.)
The fundamental proposition here asserted is that
the President as Commander-in-Chief, acting through
his subordinate military commanders, has the power

Reproduced at the National Archives at Seattle

The curfew and evacuation orders were issued solely
as a military measure to insure the defense of the
area and to prevent sabotage and espionage rather
than waiting to punish such acts after the injury has
occurred. As Professor Fairman has acutely observed:
"A commander should not be put in a worsr
position legally because l1e has contrived 'to keep
disaster at arm's length." (Fairman, The Lau•
of Martial Rule mid the N ationaJ. Emer,qency, 55
Harv. L. R. 1254, 1288 ·(June, 1942).)

EXEROISE CONTROLS OVER CIVILIANS RESIDENT WITHIN THE STATES '1
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in domestic territory lying within a theater of opera•tions to undertake precautionary and preventive
measures affecting the civilian population, which as a
matter of military necessary are required for the
defense of the area and the successful prosecution of
the war. The need for such authority is made evident by today's type of warfare, which is waged
swiftly and violently and at long range upon civilians,
factories and fields far beyond the zone of action of
contending armies. It places many areas, although
removed from the battlefront, within a theater of
operations. The supply and manufacture of war materials is so vital to success upon our world-flung
battlefields that the protection against sabotage,
espionage and fifth column .activities within domestic
territory makes the protection of home defense installations, war plants and public utilities a fundamental military concern of those charged_ with the
responsibility of conducting the war to a successful
conclusion. As this Court said recently in United
States ex rel. Quirin 'V. Cox (U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. 29,
1942, 87 L. Ed. 1) :
"Modern warfare is directed at the destruction
of enemy war supplies and the implements or
their production and transportation quite as
much as at the armed forces."

their constitutional fnnction of conducting the war,
may adopt measures directly affecting the conduct of
civilians and temporarily limiting their constitutional
rights.

Ordinarily the constitutional rights, privileges and
immunities of American citizens cannot be curtailed
by military authorities, and local, Rtat~ and federal
laws prescribe the standards of lawful conduct. But
there are occasions, in time of war when to meet an
emergency the military authorities, in carrying out

A.. Ma.rtio.l
law in time of war.

This particular exercise of the war power is usually
described as martial rule or martial law, as distinguished from the other manifold exercises of the war
power by the Executive and Congress.' 7
Speaking of Presidential Executive Order 9066,
the Tolan Committee observed:
"This order of February 19 has established a
form, of limited martial law permitting control
over all persons in designated areas and resulting
in the evacuation of an entire group, including
citizens and. aliens. '" 11

l

''
'

When the occasion requires, individual rights such
as those affected by curfew and evacuation orders
must temporarily bend to the exercise of the paramow1t and fundamental constitutional right of the
State to vreserve itself. In Shimola v. Local Board,
40 F. Supp. 808 (D.C. Ohio, 1941), it was recently
said:
"The civil rights which petitioner contends for
are more violently assailed from without than
from within. The very name of the rights which
petitioner champions implies a limitation on
Fairman, The Law 'Qf Martial Rule (1930), p. 31. Concurring opinion, Chase, C.J., in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866).
48 Gencral observations on the President's
Executive Order of
February 19, 1942.-Final Report, Tolan Committee, p. 21.
47
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Martial law is part of our common law, although
an extraordinary part, ~0 and in its greatest extent is
an accompaniment of war.G1 It has been likened to
the public right of self-defense by an individual:
"Martial law is the public right of self-defense
against a danger threatening the order or the
existence. of the state. "n

their use. Civil rights have always been subject
to military exigency." (p. 810.)

'

As already noted, the President as Commander in

Chief acting through his subordinate military commanders has the power to do all that is necessary to
protect each of the states "against invasion". ( Const.,
Art. IV, Sec. 4.) Today sabotage, espionage and the
fifth column technique are the preludes to invasion.
Measures taken to prevent the use of these methods
of modern warfare are within the mandate of the
Federal Government .
"Thus imbedded in the very fiber of the Constitution, we find not only the authority for martial
rule, but the occasions which require and justify
it, and as well the limits of its operation.' 1118

I

l

B. Exclusion without a preliminary hearing a.aa proper exercise
of martial law.

t

11his Court has conceded the right of the military
commander to take precautionary and preventive
measures such as the removal of persons from ·disturbed areas until the restoration of peace, without
the holding of any trial.

Such an extraordinary exercise of power can only
be justified by supervening necessity.

Pollock, Expansion of the Common Law, pp. 105-106.
Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule (1930), p. 98.
52 Wiencr, A Practical Manual of Martial Law, p. 16 (1940).
Seo also Winthrop, Miiitary Law and Precedents, Reprint, p. 820.
53 Graham, Martial Law in California, 3'1 Cal. L. R 6, Dee. 1942.
50

G1

49 Reports of A.B.A., 1917, p. 248; Sen. Doc. No. 105,
65th
Cong., 1st Sesa., p. 3.
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As former Chief Justice Hughes said, when speaking
of the war powers under the Constitution in an ad~
dress before the American Bar Association in 1917
during another critical period in our history:
"We are malting war as a nation organized under
the constitution, from which the established national authorities derive all their powers either
in war or in peace. The constitution is as effective today as it ever was and the oath to support
it is just as binding. But the framers of the constitution did not contrive an imposing- spectacle
of impotency. One of the objects of a ·'more perfect union' was 'to provide for the common ·defense.' A nation which could not fight would be
powerless to secure 'the Blessings of Liberty to
Ourselves and our Posterity.' Self-preservation
is· the first law of national life and the constitution itself provides the necessary powers in order
to defond and preserve the United States. Otherwise, as Mr. Justice Story said, 'the country
would be in danger of losing ·both its liberty and
its sovereignty from its dread of investing the
public councils with the power of defending it.
It would be more willing to submit to foreign
conquest than to domestic rule.' '' 0

..,
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In Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78 ·(1909), this
Court upheld the sustaining of a demurrer to a complaint seeking damages against a governor and his
military commanders for detaining one Moyer, the
head of a miners' organization, on the ground that it
was a proper measure of martial law. 'l1he disorder
was attributed to the actions of the members of the
organization. It was alleged that the imprisonment,
which had been for a period of two and a half months,
was without probable cause and that the plaintiff had
been deprived of his liberty without due process of
law. As in the present case, it was alleged that no
complaint had been filed against Moyer and that the
civil courts were open, reliance being placed upon
Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866), and Ex parte
J[ erryman, 9 Am. L. R. 524, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9487
(1861.). (p. 80 of 212 U.S.) The Court, in upholding
the judgment, first pointed out that the detentions of
persons for the purpose of restoring order were not
by way of punishment "but are by way of precaution
to prevent the exercise of hostile power" and that
when the head of the State acted upon a matter involving its life the executive could employ "temporary
detention to prevent apprehended harm". (p. 85.)0 •
Moyer had previously petitioned the Colorado courts
for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain his release from
the military de.tent.ion. (In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 154, 85
Pac. 190 (1904).) 'J~hewrit was denied and the detention was upheld as a reasonable measure for the state
military authorities to take, in these words:
11•Supra,

p. 38.

53

"To deny the right of the militia to detain those
whom they arrest while engaged in suppressin~
acts of violence and until order is restored would
lead to the most absurd results. rrhe arrest and
detention of an insurrectionist, either actually
engaged in acts of violence or in aiding and
abetting others to commit such acts, violates none
of his constitutional rights. He is• not tried by
any military court, or denied the right of trial
by jiiry; neither is he punished for violation of
law * * *. Il is arrest and detention -in such circmnstances are nierely to prevent 1,,-im,from taking
part or aiclin_gin a continuation of the conditions
which the Governor, in the discharge of his official
duties and in the exercise of the authority conferred by law, is endeavoring to suppress. * * *
It is true that petitioner is not held by virtue of
any warrant, but, if his arrest and detention are
authorized by law, he cannot complain * * * "
(85 Pac. 193.)
Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp. 355 ·(1935);
In re Boyle (Idaho, 1899), 57 Pac. 706;
Ex parte McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143 Pac. 947
(1914).
The conclusion to be drawn from such precautionary
measures of martial law as exclusion or detention has
been well stated by Wiener, supra:
"Whenever there is riot or insurrection, there
are pretty .certain to be ringleaders; once these an~
apprehended, the back of the disturbance is likely
to be broken. Accordingly, commanders ordered
into the field to suppress domestic disorders have
almost. invariably centered their attention on t.he
heads of the offending movement, have arrested
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Fairman reaches a similar conclusion:
"It would seem to follow from the foregoing that
preventive detention for a reasonable period is
regarded by the courts as a legitimate means of
coping ,vith an insurrection, and that in the exercise of judicial discretion a writ of habeas corpus
may not be allowed if it would interfere with the
0 ~Wicner,

pp. 66-67.

A Practical Manual of Martial Law (1940), Para. 71,

governor in the performance of his duty to suppress insurrection.' 'G 0
C. The English courts have upheld the validity of excluding
persons from vital war zones.

If such precautionary measures may be undertaken
in times of domestic unrest they are also proper in
time of war when the life of the nation is at stake.
During the last World Wai· the British House of
Lords, in Rex v. Halliday (1917), 1 A.C. 260, affirming
(1916) 1 K.B. 238, upheld the propriety of regulations
by which the residence of any person could be regulated or any person excluded or interned in view of the
hostile origin or assooiations of the person, when it
appeared to the Secretary of State expedient for securing the public safety. The Court said:
"One of the most obvious means of taking precautions against dangers such as are enumerated
is to impose some restriction on the freedom of
movement of persons whom there may be any
reason to suspect of being disposed to help the
enemy. It is to this that reg. 14B is directed. The
measure is not punitive but precautiona.ry. It was
strongly urged that no such restraint should be
imposed except as the result of judicial inquiry,
and indeed counsel for the appellant went so far
as to contend that no regulation could be rmade
forbidding access to the seashore by suspected
versons. It seems obivous that no tribunal for
investigating the questions whether circumstances
of suspicion exist warranting some restraint can
be imagined less appropriate than a Court of law.
G6

Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule (1930), Para. 44, p. 177.
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them, and have kept them in custody until such
time as the disorders subsided and/or the persons
detained could be turned over to the civil authorities for trial. In niany instances, no trial ever
• took place; the detention was conceived to be entirely preventive and not at all punitive. * * *
'.l'his procedure, which did not involve the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, or the supersession of civil courts by military tribunals, or
indeed any domination of the civil authorities bv
the military but rather the closest cooperatio;1
between them, has come fairly generally to be.
known as qualified martial law or preventive niart£al law. Where there has been violence or disorder in fact, continued detention of offenders by
the military is so far proper as to result in a
denial by the courts of :writs releasing those
detained and a refusal, after they have been released, of damages for false imprisonment. The
legality of the practice has 'been sustained in
Idaho, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Indiana,
and Iowa, and has received the imprimatur of
approval of the United States Supreme Court in
/JIoyer v. Peabody. It is, therefore, hardly open
to question today. "G 5

55
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It is true that the regulations or orders provided
that the internee could make any representations to an
advisory committee against the order, which would
then make a report to the Secretary. This in no way
affected the broad discretionary power given to him,
nor did it take from him the sole power to decide
whether the internment order should be revoked or
varied. This is evident from the language of the
order, "If I am satisfied by the report * * * that the
order may be revoked or varied without injury to the
public safety or defense of the realm, I will revoke or
vary the order * * *.''

The Court then makes some observations which we
believe are particularly pertinent to the instant case:
"However precious the personal liberty of the
subject may be, there is something for which it
may well be to some extent, sacrificed by legal
enactment, namely, national success in the war, or
escape from national plunder or enslavement. It
is not contended in this case that the personal
liberty of the s·ubject can be invaded arbitrarily
at the mere whim of the Executive. What is contended is that the Executive has been empowered
during the war, for paramount objects of State,
to invade by legislative enactment that liberty in
certain states of fact.'' (p. 271.)
"One of the most effective ways of preventing a
man from communicating with the enemy or doing
things such as are mentioned in s. 1, sub-s. l(a)
and (c), of the statute is to imprison or intern
him. In that as in almost every case where preventive justice is put in force some suffering and
inconvenience may be caused to the suspected
person. That is inevitable. But the suffering is,
under this statute, inflicted for something much
more important than his liberty or convenience,
namely, for securing the public safety and defense
of the realm." (p. 273.)

~

And more recently, under conditions of World War
II, where sabotage and espionage are being employed
as instruments of warfare as never before, the English
Courts have upheld the power of the Executive to
remove or detain citizens whose .actions might endanger the conduct of the war. 117 In Liversidge v.
Anderson (1942), 1 A.O. 206, the House of Lords
upheld the internment of a British citizen under
Regulation 18B of the Emergency Powers (Defense)
Act of 1939 (2 and 3 Geo. VI, c. 62), which provided
that the Secretary of State could make det~ntion orders
"with a view to preventing (the internee) acting in a
1171n Canada regulations similar to the English regulations
have
been adopted. By the order of the Minister of Justice, dated
August 18, 1942, a protected area in the Province of British
Columbia along the Pacific Coast has been prescribed similar to
the Pacific Coast Military Areas, which order provides in part:
"9. Every person of the Japanese race shall leave the
prote;cted area aforesaid forthwith.
10. No person of Japanese race shall enter such protected
urea except under permit issued by the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police.'' ( Canadian Gazette, Extra No. 96, August
31, 1942.)

See

King v. Governor of Wormwood Scrubbs Prison
(1920), 2 K.B. 305.
_.....
~'....
_
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No crime is charged. 'l'he question is whether
there is ground for suspicion that a particular
person may be disposed to help the enemy. * * *"
(p. 269.)

I.
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manner prejudicial to the public safety or defense of
the realm." The House of Lords reiterated what it
had previously said in Rex v. Halliday, supra:
"At a time when it is the undoubted law of the
land that a citizen may by conscription or requisition be compelled to give up his life and all that
he possessed for his country's cause it may well
be no matter for surprise that there should be confided to the Secretary of State a discretionary
power of enforcing the relatively mild precaution
of detention." (Per Lord Macmillan, p. 47.)
Greene v. Secretary of Staie for II ome Affairs
(1942), 1 A.O. 284.

No. 1 conti-ary to the exclusion orders of Lieutenant
General DeWitt. His petition challenged the constitutionality of Presidential Executive Order 9066, the
particular Exclusion Order, which was identical with
the one here under review, and Public Law 503. The
Court, in denying the petition, held that the exclusion
of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific
Coast was a constitutional exercise of the war power:
"* * * This court will not constitute itself as a
board of strategy, and declare what is a necessary
or proper military area. * * * The field of military operation is not confined to the scene of
actual physical combat. Our cities and transportation systems, our ooastline, our harbors, and
even our agricultural areas are all vitally important in the all-out war effort in which our
country must engage if our form of government.
is to survive. * * * The theater of war is no
longer limited to any definite geographical area.
Saboteurs have already landed on our coasts. This
court can take judicial notice of the extensive
manufacturing facilities for airplanes and other
munitions of war which are located on or near
fJur west coast." (p. 288.)

In commenting upon the English decisions Professor Fairman says:
"All of this, one may say, is no precedent for
construing our own Constitution. But where kindred people who once held the same doctrines as
ourselves have been driven to adopt new views of
war power, that experience is most persuasive in
weighing the authority to be conceded to our own
government in like emergencies.' ' 118
D. The decisions of the District Courts.

In Ex parte Kana£, 46 Fed. Supp. 286 (D.C., E.D.,
Wisc., July 29, 1942), the petitioner, an American
citizen of Japanese ancestry, resident in San Francisco, California, sought to obtain his release upon a
writ of habeas corpus when he was taken into custody
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for his return to San Francisco to stand trial on an information charging him
under Public Law 503 with having left Military Area
118Fairnum, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency, 55 Harvard L. R. 1253, 1256 (June 1942).

"Rights of the individual, under our federal Constitution and its amendments, are not absolute.
When such rights come into conflict with other
rights granted for the protection and safety and
general welfare of the public, they must at times
give way. * * * In re Schroeder Hotel Co. (CCA,
7th), 86 F. (2d) 481; Hitchman Coal & Colee Co.
v. M-itchell, et al,., 245 U. S. 229. * * * That there
is nothing about the executive order, or the designation of the military areas, which is unconstitutional, is very certain, considering the necessities
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and the exigencies of war which have already
struck upon our Pacific Coast." (p. 288.) 50

dim-out,00 and the requiring of the evacuation of certain persons as in the present case.

In Ex parte Ventura, 44 Fed. Supp. 520 (W.D.,
Wash., N.D., 1942), a Japanese American citizen, resident of Seattle, sought by a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to challenge the validity of the curfew
orders as imposed upon .American citizens of Japanese
ancestry. The Court upheld the curfew orders as a
proper military measure in the Hght of conditions
within the Western Theater of Operations.
"I do not believe the Constitution of the United
States is so unfitted for survival that it. unyieldingly prevents the President and the Military,
pursuant to law enacted by the Congress, from
restricting the movements of civilians such as
petitioner, regardless of how actually loyal they
perhaps may be, in critical military areas desperately essential for national defense." (p. 523.)

As Winthrop says in Military Law and Precedents,
Reprint, page 820:
"Martial law is indeed 1·esorted to as much for
the protection of the lives and property of peaceable individuals as for the repression of hostile
or violent elements. It may become requisite that
it supersede for the time the existing civil institutions, but, in general, except in so far as relates to
persons violating military orders or regulations,
or otherwise interfering with the exercise of miliii:!ry authority, martial law does not in effect suspend the local law or jurisdiction or materially
restrict the liberty of the citizen; it may call upon
him to perform special service or labor for the
public defense, but otherwise usually leaves him
to his ordinary avocation."
Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall,
206 Pa. St. 165, 55 A.ti. 942 (1903);
Ex parte McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143 Pac. 947
(1914);
In re Boyle (Idaho, 1899), 57 Pac. 706.

E. Martial law by the test of neoessity ma.ybe limited.

It is not necessary for the military authorities to
replace civilian authorities completely. Under martial
law all civilian functions may be taken over, or it may
be limited to particular phases concerning the defense
of a military area such as the institution of curfew,
5 0Jn United States 11. Korematsu
(U.S.D.C., N.D., Cal., S.D.,
No. 27635-W, 1942) the defendant, an American Japanese resident
in San Francisco, by demurrer raised objections, similar to those
offered by appellant, to an information charging him under Public
Law 503 with having violated an exclusion order. The demurrer
was overruled by Judge Martin I. Welsh on December 1, 1942,
and Korematsu was tried and convicted by Judge A. F. St. Sure
<S.F. Recorder, December 9, 1942). An appeal has been taken to
tho Ninth Circuit Court 'of Appeals •(No. 10,248). Certain procedural questions certified by the Ninth Circuit Court are now
before this Court for decision.

I

l
I'

One of the best expressions of the principle is contained in Bishop, New Criminal Law, 8th Ed., sec. 53
(1892):
"Martial law is elastic in its nature and easily
adapted to varying circumstances. It may operate to .the total suspension or overthrow of civil
authority; or its touch may be light, scarcely felt
0pinion NS4826 of Attorney General of California, holding
that Dim-out Proclamation No. 12 (Oct. 10, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg.
8377) by Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt, was a proper exercise
of limited martial law which superseded lighting requirements of
tho California. V chicle Code.
60
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which is collected and discussed in Fairman, Law of
Martial Rule .and the National Emergency, 55 Harv.
L. R. 1254, 1287, and in Wiener, A Practical Manual
of Martial Law (1940), p. 19.

or not felt at all by the mass of the people, while
the Courts go on in their ordinary course, and the
business of the community flows in its accustomed
channels.''
F. A declaration of martial law Lsnot required..

The trial court in Yasui v. United iStates (No. 871)
rejected the concept that the military authorities could
exercise limited martial rule such as the imposition of
curfew. This is opposed to the weight of authority,
6 1Executive Order 9066. No declaration of martial law accompanied the issuance of Presidential Executive Order 9066 under
which the evacuation of Japanese-Americans from Pacific Coast
military areas was accomplished.
Professor Charles Fairman, the author of "The Law of Martial
Rule" ( 1930), commented on this fact as follows :
"Tho President has made no such proclamation and if he
did his constitutional powers would not be increased one
whit. The question in every case of military control would
still be, can tho action complained of he justified as apparently reasonable and appropriate, under the circumstances,
to the defense of the nation and the prosecution of the wart"
(San Francisco Chronicle, March 4, 1942, p. 14.)

'l'he test -0f necessity which will justify the exercise
of military authority over civilians should be formulated and applied in accordance with today's military
problems. It is contended that the curfew and exclusion orders were not valid because no invasion of the
States of ,vashington, Oregon and California had deposed the civil authorities or had closed the civil
courts. Reliance for this proposition that the justifying situation must be in this extremity before a military commander can act is placed mainly upon the
dictum of the majol'it.y in Ex parte JJfilligan, 4 Wall.
2 (1866). Because of the frequent reference to this
famous Civil War case, a close analysis is justified
in order to show the proper application of what was
said in that case.

t

In 1864 Lambdin P. Milligan, a civilian and resident
of the St.ate of Indiana, was arrested by order of
General Hovey. He was tried before a military commission convened at Indianapolis, on various charges
of aiding the Southern cause, and sentenced to be
hanged. At the time of the arrest Indiana was not
threatened with attack, although previously Southern
troops had invaded the State. Milligan 's petition for
a writ of habeas corpus reached the United States
Supreme Court upon a certificate of disagreement
from the Federal Circuit Court. The writ was granted
upon the ground that Congress, to whom, the Court
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G. The test of necessity.

Appellant argues that martial law has not been declared on the Pacific Coast. (Tr. 40.) 'rhe fact that
martial law has not been proclaimed in Vvashington,
Oregon or California or that the military authorities
have not taken over all civilian functions does not
mean that the within principles of martial law do not
apply to the measures undertaken by the military authorities on the Pacific Coast. No formal declaration
of martial law was needed as a prerequisite to the
measures of martial law which have already been
undertaken. If the necessity exists to exercise military
control in a particular manner, a proclamation is unnecessary. It is the necessity which provides the justi01
fication, not the issuance of a proclamation.

said, the power was committed, had not authorized
trial by military commission.01 •. rrhe decision, joined
in by all members of the Court, disposed of the case
upon jurisdictional grow1ds. However, a bare majority of five went on. gratuitoUBly62 to say that Congress in any case would not have had the power to
authorize trial by military commission at any place
outside th8 theater of active war, because, it said:
"Martial law cannot rise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present;
the invasion real, such as effectively closes the
Courts and deposes the civil administration. * * 11
· Martial rule can never exist where the Courts are
open and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the
locality of actual war." (p. 127.)
On the other hand, a minority of four, led by Chief
Justice Chase, in a specially concurring opinion, took
issue with this dictum and contended that:
"Where peace exists the laws of peace mUBt prevail. What we do maintain is, that when the
nation is involved in war and some portions of
the country are invaded and all are exposed to
invasion, it is within the power of Congress to
determine in what states or districts such great
lll•Congrcss had provided that :if those arre!iled by Presidential
authority were citizens of Stutes where the administration of law
by the Federal Courts was wnimpaired, the lists of these citizens
must be sent to the local Federal Judges, who could then release
any prisoner not indicted by the next l<'cdcral Grand Jury; the
statute said nothing about military trials of such prisoners. (12
Stat. 755 (1863).)
e2Hanoy, C.J ., dissenting in Zimmerman v. Walkcr, 132 Fed.
(2d) 442 (l!J42), states that the general statement of the majority
was not dicta (p. 450). Nevertheless, the right of the military
to imposo restrictions upon civiliuns within the United States
when reasonably necessary to repel invasion is recognized.

65

and imminent public dang-er exists as justifies the
authorization of military tribwials for the trial
of crimes and offenses against the discipline and
security of the army or against the public safety."
(p. 140.)
Because of the frequent reference made in this case
to the fact that the Courts in this eombat zone were
open and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of
their jurisdiction, it is important to note that this
part of the majority dictum must be confined to the
serious question of whether or not and upon what
occasion a civilian may be tried by military commission.6 3 It is difficult to perceive what application, one
way or another, the fact that the Courts are open or
not would have upon a determination of the justification for the Army's taking precautionary measures to
prevent sabotage and espionage and to protect the
civilian population within a theater of operations.
The view of the majority that martial law must be
confined to the locality of actual war does not require
a change of this phase of the test of necessity but
merely a new and realistic conception of the locale of
war being waged today. In 1866, when the Supreme
Court rendered the Milligan decision, the methods of
warfare were such that a civilian government would
be disrupted and unable to secure public safety at
home only when a locality lay under the seige guns of
an attacking force. rl'he Court then was loolmg at a
scene where the principal offensive force was the foot
83
As the Court itself puts the question, "Upon the facts stated
in l\Iilligan's petition, and the exhibits filed, has the military commission mentioned in it jurisdiction, legally, to try and sentence
him?" Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 118 (1866). (Italics by the
Court.)

~
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soldier and cavalry and where civilian authority could
carry out its function of maintaining the safety of
citizens until it was forced to flee by the imminent
danger of capture. Seventy-seven years ago the theater of actual war wherein the army might have to
exert control was the area of operations of the contending armies. 0 •
Even during the last World War, in United States
ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 754 (1920), a
Federal Court held that New York Harbor was
"within the theater of war". The decision upheld the
authority of a naval court martial to try the plaintiff,
Herman Wessels, as a German spy because of his
espionage activities in the vicinity of New York Harbor. Wessels contended that on the basis of the Milligan case, the naval court had no jurisdiction to try
him because his activities were in the United States,
rather than in Europe where the fighting was going
on. Furthermore, he contended the Federal Courts in

the Ncw York Federal District were functioning. On
appeal the Federal Court upheld the jurisdiction of
the naval court and pointed out:
"The term 'theater of war', as used in the Milligan case, apparently was intended to mean the
territory of activity of conflict. With the progress
made in obtaining ways and means for devastation and destruction, the territory of the United
States was certainly within the field of active
operations. Great numbers of troops were being
sent abroad, and in large numbers, sailing from
the Port of New York. * * * Ships were being
destroyed within easy distance of the Atlantic
coast; there was a constant threat of and fear of
airships above the harbor and City of New York
on missions of destructT'on." (p. 764.)

6 -IBut even in 1904, Sir Frederick Pollock, a student of martial
law, wrote:
"It also seems that the range of those acts must extend to
tho prevention of aid and comfort to the enemy beyond the
bounds of places where warlike operations arc in sight. In
many places there may outwardly be peace, and yet modern
means of communication may admit of important aid being
conveyed to the enemy in the shape of information, supplies,
and personal adherents. In this manner the effective radius
of a state of war has been multiplied tenfold or more. By
recognizing this fact we do not alter the law, but apply it
to the facts as they exist; nor do we disparage tho wisdom of
our predecessors who declared their opinion of the law in a
form appropriate to the facts as known to them. "-Sir Frederick Pollock, Law Quarterly Review, Vol. XVIII, p. 152
(1904).
"What was not ncces.'mry a century ago may be necessary
t.oday. "-Haney, J., dissenting in Zimmerman v. Walker, 32
Fed. (2d) 442.

What the Court said twenty-three years ago is now
many times as obvious and applicable to the present
situation on the Pacific Coast. A review of the authorities indicates that there is general agreement that the
majority dictum went too far when it said that martial
law cannot arise from a ·threatened danger; that the
Courts and civil administration must already have
been deposed.
Fairman, The Law of. Martial Rule (1930), p.

145;
Willoughby, Constitutional Law, 2nd Ed.
1602;
Glenn, The Army and the Law, 188-190.
The dictum of the majority fails to meet today's
time conditions. It requires an invasion and the
plete breakdown of civil government before the
tary may act ..

III,

warcommili-

Reproduced at the National Archives at Seattle

1,,:1:,J•>~'····

69

68

Former Chief Justices Hughes, SJ?eaking before the
American Bar .Association in 1917 about the test in
the Milligan case, said:
"Certainly, the test should not be a mere physical
one, nor should substance ·be sacrified to form. " 0 ~

In 1919 Judge Learned Hand, writing in Commercial Cable Co.· v. Burleson, 255 Fed. 99 •(1919), with
reference to the President's power as Comrnander-inChief to take over cable lines for war use, declared:
"But, indeed, it would be a lame comprehension
of the scope and variety of modern war, which
limited its activities to the immediate theater of
military operations.'' (p. 104.)
Today our nation-wide civilian defense preparations
illustrate that many areas of the United States can
be considered a theater of war. 'l'his was recently
and vividly made clear by the landing on our eastern
shores of German saboteurs whose sabotage objectives
lay in various places in the East and Midwest. (Ex
parte Quirin, supra.) Today long-range bombing
planes and carrier-based aircraft and far-roving submarines place a large portion of our country and
States within the. area of threatened invasion.
eirwar Powers Under the Constitution, A.B.A. Rep., 1917, p.
248; Sen. Doc. 105, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3.

Ex parte Ventura,· 44 Fed. Supp. 520, 523
(1942);
Ex parte Kanai, 46 Fed. Supp. 286, 288 (1942).

v.

EXTENT or JUDICIAL REVIEW OP ACTION TAKEN
BY MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

In Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378 (1932), this
Court declared :
"What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions." (p. 399.)

It is quite clear that this Court had in mind that
a military commander in time of war, charged with
the awful responsibility of conducting his mission
as part of the whole plan for the successful conduct of
the war and the protection of civilians within his command, must :be allowed a wide choice of the means by
.which he will me, emergencies affecting his mission.
As this Court pointed out in the Sterling case, the
Executive acting in his military capacity will be allowed ,,a range· of honest judgment as to the measures to be taken * * *, for without such liberty to
m.alceiuimed·iate dec£sions, the power itself would be
useless". (p. 399.)
rl'o hold the curfew and evacuation orders invalid,
the Court would have to say that there was no foundation for a military commander to believe that the
,Japanese population on the Pacific Coast had to be,
as a whole, moved inland.
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Insistence upon applying the dictum of the Milliga.n
case to today 1s conditions may be a judicial example
of the disastrous error into which many democracies
have fallen--that of affording more protection to the
civil liberties at home than to safeguarding them from
the attacks from without.
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As Mr. Justice Haney said in Zimnwrman v. Walker, 132 Fed. (2d) 442:
"Where the military asserts a right to exercise
some powers of government, usually -in the f on 11
of restriction,s, and do not approach a complete
military government, the right, if it exists at all,
comes from the right to do all that is necessary
'to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions' and to protect
each of the states 'against Invasion'. Compare:
Winthrop, supra, 1275. Whether a particular action is 'necessary' is a question of fact to be determined from proof of, among other things, the
reason for the 1·estriction, its purpose, and tlH'
improvement of methods and engines of war.
What was not necessary a century ago, may be
necessary today.

the vital Pacific Coast military areas. 'l,he evacuation
was obviously conceived in good faith in the face of
the emergency and directly related to the danger at
hand.

*

*

*

*

*

*
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"If the courts find that the action of the military
is reasonably necessary to accomplish one of the
four purposes mentioned above, then the case is
ended because the Constitution prohibits further
action by the courts, but if the court makes a contrary finding, it has the Constitutional duty to
carry out its fm1ction to declare the military action ineffective." (at pp. 450, 451, 452.)
The possibility that disloyalty, either potential or
active, could have. been disclosed through the holding
of individual hearings is at!least sufficiently doubtful,
particularly in view of the time ·element, so that it
can be said that General DeWitt certainly did not
abuse his discretionary powers or go beyond the range
•of his honest judgment when he decided to remove
all persons of Japanese ancestry, as a group, from

I

4

l
I
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As the United States District Court for the Souther1{District of New York sa.id in United States v.
Uhl, 46 Fed. Supp. 618 (1942), with reference to the
President's proclamation in ordering the detention of
enemy aliens:
'' '!,his court, in times like these, will resolve any
doubts it may have * * * in favor of the President's and Attorney General's actions.''

Or, as the trial court said:
"Nor can defendant substitute his judgment for
the judgment of the Commander in Chief and the
general acting under the President's direction,
pursuant to constitutional powers and the Congressional ratification and authority of Public
Law 503." (46 Fed. Supp. 657, 662 (1942).)
'l'he argwnent here presented can well be concluded
with what the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recently said in Zimmierrnan v. Walker, 132
Fed.. (2d) 442 (1942), concerning detention as a
proper preventive measure of martial law:
"The civil com-ts are ill adapted to cope with an
emergency of this kind. As a rule they proceed
only upon formal charges. '!,heir province is to
determine questions of guilt or innocence of
crimes already committed. In this respect their
functions are punitive, not preventive; whereas
the purpose of 'the detention of suspected persons
in critical military areas in time of war is to
forestall injury and to prevent the commission of
a~t.~ lrnlnfnl to t.hP. r.nmnv. Tt. ii:i RP.ttlPrl th~t tho
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detention by the military authorities of persons
engaged in disloyal conduct or suspected of disloyalty is lawful in areas where conditions warranting martial rule prevail. Measures like these
are essential at times if our national life is to be
preserved. Where taken in the genuine interest of
the public safety they are not without, but within,
the framework of the constitution.'' (p. 446.)
Likewise, with the less severe measure of exclusion,
persons suspected of disloyalty may be excluded from
a military area in ti.me of war where such exclusion has
a reasonable bearing upon the defense of the area.
VI.

OONGRESS HAD THE POWER TO ENACT PUBLIC LAW 603
IN AID OF THE PRESIDENT'S POWER AS COMMANDE&IN-CHIEF AND THAT OF HIS SUBORDINATE COMMANDING
GENERALS TO MAKE RULES PERTAINING TO THE CON-

DUCT OF CIVILIANS IN PRESCRIBED MILITARY AREAS.

A. Public Lo.w 603 Did Not Delegate Authority to the President.

Thus far it has been demonstrated that the President as Commander-in-Chief and his military commanders, in the exercise of their constitutional power
to conduct the war and to protect the P!tcific Coast
Stat~s against attack and threatened invasion could
impose curfew regulations upon all persons of J apanese ancestry and .could order them to evacuate these
areas. rrhe next important question which the aniici
curiae wish to discuss is the validity of Public Law
503 (77th Cong., 2nd Sess., Ch. 191, March 21, 1942)
under which the appellant was convicted for having
violated the curfew proclamation and Exclusion Order
57 (Tr. 1-2).
The States of Washington, Oregon and California·
n-~
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of this Act, which provides a sanction under federal
criminal law for the enforcement of the measures
which the Commanding General has adopted or may
in the future adopt for the protection of the Pacific
Coast, as, for example, Proclamations Nos. 10 (Aug.
5, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 6631) and 12 ( Oct. 10, 1942, 7
Fed. Reg. 8377), providing for dim-out. Public Law·
503 specifically refers to entering, remaining in or
leaving a prescribed military area or the doing of
any other act contrary to the restrictions applicable
in the area, or to the order of the Secretary of War
or any designated military commander. A person
cannot be fow1d guilty thereunder w1less he knew or
should have known of the existence and the extent
of the restrictions and orders and that his act was in
violation thereof. This law is attacked on the ground
that it improperly delegates to the President, the
Secretary of War or any designated military commander the power first to designate the military area
or zone and 'then to determine the acts prohibited
therein, the doing of which the law makes criminal.
(Tr. 42.)
Public Law 503 is not an •w1constitutional delegation
because the power to designate military areas in
domestic territory and, under military necessity, to
~orbid the doing of acts '.therein already resides in the
President and his subordinate military commanders
by virtue of the war power. (Supra, Pt. 2.) This
right to prescribe the military areas and to make
restrictions therein resides in the military authorities
without any authority from Congress.
All this law attempts to do is'to provide for enforcem!mt in t.lrn Feclernl criminal courts of t.he or<forR
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The United States Supreme Court has recognized
the power of Congress to provide sanctions for the
carrying out of the constitutional powers of the Presidency. In United States 11. Cu,rtiss-Wright Corporation, 299 U. S. 304 (1936), the Supreme Court upheld
a criminal statute passed for the purpose of assisting
the President in carrying out his constitutional power
to deal with foreign affairs. A congressional resolution authorized the President to prol1ibit the sale of
munitions of war in the United States to countries
engaged in war in the Chaco region of South America,
except under such limitations and exc~ptions as he
might prescribe, whenever 'he found that such prohibition would contribute to the reestablishment of peace
between the countries involved. 'rhe resolution in
effect provided a fine and/or imprisonment for sales
made in violation of the proclamation (p. 312). The
President thereafter made such findings in his proclamation. An indictment charging a violation of the
Joint Resolution and the Proclamation of the President was ·demurred to on the grounds that the resolution constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative
power to the executive. In part it was contended that
the resolution was unconstitutional because it only
went into effect upon the making of a proclamation
which was left to his unfettered discretion, thus con0 °Congrci;sional Record, March 19, 1942, pp. 2804, 2807 (unbound ed.). (House Report No. 1906, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess.,

pp. 2-3.)
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Ututing an attempted substitution of the President's
will for that of Congress, and also that the extent of
its operation in particular cases was subject to limitations and exceptions by the President, controlled by
no standard. In rejecting these contentions (p. 329)
the Court said that in in such external matters as
foreign affairs and the waging of war the general rule
regarding mtlawful delegation of legislative authority either did not apply to such matters or would be
very broadly construed.
"Practically every volume of the United States
Statutes contains one or more acts or joint resolutions of Congress authorizing action by the
President in respect of subjects affecting foreign
relations, which either leave the exercise of the
power to his unrestricted judgment, or provide
a standard far more general than that which has
·always been considere~ requisite with regard to
domestic affairs.''

8

Similarly the same freedom of action must be allowed
the Commander-in-Chief in his conduct of the war.
Part of the President's war power is the right to
establish certain measures of control over civilian
• activity when military necessity requires, otherwise de- .
scribed as limited martial rule or law. This right is
derived from his constitutional position and does not
require an act of Congr.ess for its exercise. Pointing
out that the power to conduct foreign affairs was derived from the constitutional powers of the President,
••
the Court said:
"It is important to bear in mind that we are here
dealing not alone with an authority vested in the
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issued by the military authorities pursuant to the
war power of the President. That this was its purpose is evident from the congressional debates on the
law at the time of its passage. 00
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Congress, to assist the President in perfonning his
constitutional. duty as Commander in Chief, may by
statute provide a sanction to be administered in the
Federal Courts, just as Congress did in the OiirtissW right case, to assist the President in carrying out
his function in the field of inten1ational relations. In
the Curtiss-TV right case the statute was uphe]d although it provided a punishment for the violation
of the President's proclamation, which was to be
made after the passage of the congressional act.
B. If Public Law 603 is considered as a delegation, such
delegation was not unconstitutional.

While it is believed that Public Law 503 is valid
when construed as a law which merely provides a
sanction for the carrying out of an otherwise proper
constitutional power committed to the President,
nevertheless this law is not unconstitutional if it is
interpreted as delegating to the President, the Secretary of War or designated military commanders the
power to define military areas or zones and to prescribe restrictions flrnrein, the violation of which the
statute makes criminal,

......

Speaking of the delegation of the Congressional
war power, it was recently said in United States v.
Wright, 48 Fed. Supp. 687 (Jan. 1943):
"* * * I find that no court has ever attempted
to strike down what Congress has determined to
be appropriate to carry into effect its broad war
powers under the Constitution. In fact, the question of delegation has seldom, if ever, appeared in
connection with a construction of the war power."
(p. 689.)
In judging the use of Congressional war power, this
Court said in Harnilton v. Kentucky Distilleries, etc.,
251 U . .S. 14G,40 S. Ct. 106 (1919):
"* * * to Congress in the exercise of its powers,
not least the war power upon which the very life
of the nation depends, a wide latitude of discretion must be accorded; * * *" (p. 163.)
Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 30 (1827); .
Dakota Gent. Tel. Co. v. State, 250 U. S. 163,
39 S. Ct. 507 (1919).

I
_..__
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President by an exertion of legislative power, but
with such an authority plus the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President
as the sole organ of the federal gove1111nentin the
field of international relations-a
power which
does not require as a basis for its exercise an act
of Congress, but which, of course, like every other
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the
Constitution.'' (pp. 319-320.)

_,,_

A ease directly in point on the right of Congress
to leave to the Executive the designation of the area
within which an act may be criminal is M cKinle11 v.
United :States, 249 U. '8. 397 (1919), wherein an Act
of Congress authorizing the Secretary of War to do
everything "deemed necessary to suppress and prevent the setting up of houses of ill fame * * * wit.bin
such distance as he may deem needful of any military camp * * *" was not held to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. As stated by
the Court:
i

·--·
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"Congress may leave details to the regulation of
the head of an executive department, and punish
those who violate the restrictions."

I

I

The standard implied in Public Law 503 is that
the restrictions must be .appropriate to the conduct
of the war in a military area. Orders of the military
authorities beyond this test would be held to be -uJltra
vires as being beyond the constitutional powers of the
armed forces. In other words Public iLaw 503 is like- •
wise confined to emergency situations and impliedly
contains the requirement that the measures must bear
a reasonable :c01mectionto military necessity. '11 his is
the only practicable standard which Congress could
set down. What restrictions would be appropriate will
•change, from time to time and from iJJlaceto place,
with the changing war situation. It is the only standard under the circumstances '' that is practicable or
needed". (Avent v. United States, supra.)
With reference to the violation of Civilian Exclusion Orders such as No. 57, the one immediately involved here, it is important to ,note that the standard
for these evacuation orders is specifically set forth
in Public Law 503, which declares that "whoever shall
enter, re'main ,in, leave, * * *" any prescribed mi]itary
area or zone contrary to the restrictions applicable in
the area or zone shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Hence, having in mind ,the foregoing authorities with
reference to the power of Congress to authorize the
issuance of regulations by executive branches of the
govermnent for the purpose of applying a standard
and to make a disobedience of such regulations a

.l
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"Congress may make violations of the Cmmnission 's rules a crime.''

In other phases of federal activity,_ the Courts have
upheld legislation .making the violation of regulation8
a criminal act. In Avent v. United States, 266 U. S.
127 (1924), the Transportation Act (41 Stat. 456)
authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission,
whenever it is of the opinion that shortage of equipment, congestion of traffic or other emergency requiring immediate action ~xists in :any section -of the
country, to make such reasonable rules with regard
to it as in the Commission's opinion will best promote
the service in the interest of the public and the commerce of the people. It also authorized the Conunission to give directions for preference or priority in
the transportation or movement of traffic. '11 he defendant was indicted for a violation of a priority order.
Holding that no constitutional question was involved,
the Court said:
"That it (Congress) can give the powers here
given to the Commission, if that question is open
here, no longer admits of dispute. Interstate Comnierce Comrnission v. Illinois Cent-tul Railroad
Co., 215 U. S. 452; United States v. Grimaud, 220
u. s. 506.
'' The statute connnes the power of the Commission to emergencies, and the requirements that
the rules shall be reasonable and in the interest
of the public and commerce fixes the only standard that is practicable or needed.
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crime, it clearly appears here that with reference to
Civilian Exclusion Orders such as No. 57, the standard of remaining in a military area or zone is clearly
set in the statute.

invalid delegation of legislative power, the Court
sayu!g:
"A violation of reasonable rules regulating the
use and occupancy of the property is made a
crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress.
The statute, not the Secretary, fixes the penalty.''

In Campbell v. Chase National Bank, 5 Fed. Supp.
156 (1933), Congress (Title 50, .App. sec. 5) authorized the President in time of war or other national
emergency recognized and declared by him, to investigate, regulate and prohibit exporting, hoarding,
melting or earmarking of gold or silver coin, etc. Hr.
was also authorized to make necessary rules and regulations. The Court, in ;holding that this grant of au- .
thority was not an unconstitutional delegation, declared:
"It is now also settled that a regulation made
within the mandate of such delegated power may
be the basis of criminal proceedings." (Citing
cases and McKinley v~ United States, 249 U. 8.
397.)

In the instant case the restrictions and orders are
based upon military necessity and the carrying out
of the President's power to conduct the war. 'l,he
violation of these restrictions and orders based upon
military necessity is made a crime, not by the President, the Secretary of War or the military commander,
but by Congress. The statute, not the President, the
Secretary or the military commander, fixes the
penalty.07
C. Ratification of curfew and exclusion orders by CongreSB.

Assuming that it was necessary for Congress to authorize the imposition of curfew and the exclusion of
persons from military areas, the legislative history of
the A~t shows that the purpose of it.s passage was to
implement the orders issued under Executive Order
9066 by providing for enforcement in the federal
criminal courts, and that Congress had before it
Public Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2, designating the
military areas and specifically stating that such persons or classes of persons as the ~ituation required

It should be noted that it is Congress which makes
the disobedience of the military restrictions a crime
and that no effort is made by the military authorities
to prescribe, Jimit or enlarge the criminal penalty. In
United States v. Grirnaiul, 220 U. S. 506 (1911), it
was held that a statute providing that the Secretary of
Agriculture ''may make such rules and regulations
* * * to regulate the use and occupancy (National
li'orest Reservations) and to preserve the forests
therein from destruction; and any .violation of the
provisions of this act and such rules and regulations
shall be punished" as provided by statute, was not an
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For a useful discussion on the general question of the delegation of Congressional war power, see Charles Evans Hughrs,
War Powers Under the Constitution, Reports of A.B.A., 1917,
p. 248; Sen. Doc. 105, 65th Cong., 1st Sess.
I
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would be excluded from these areas. Curfew was likewise contemplated. 08

quirements of certainty with much greater strictness
than the ordinary rules require, because it provides
that a person can be pWlished only "if it appears that
he knew or should have known of the existence and
extent of the .restrictions or order and that his act was
in violation thereof".

D. Public Law 603 is not invalid on the ground of uncertainty.

The contention is made that Public Law 503 is invalid because it falls within the .rule that a criminal
statute which does not define with certainty the acts
prohibited is void. It is charged that the law does not
inform a person of the nature and cause of the charge
I ·, to be made against him and therefore violates the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
The fnndamental reason for all rules regarding certainty in criminal statutes is that a man cannot be
punished for the doing of an act unless he had an
opportunity ,to know just what was prohibited and just
what was permitted. Where a statute itself defines
the prescribed act with certainty, the law says that
ignorance of the terms of the statute is no excuse.
'rhe ready answer to tlie objections to Public Law
503 on the ground of nncertainty is that the law is far
more considerate of an accused and fulfills the re68 "Tho purpose of the proposed legislation is to provide for
enforcement in the Federal criminal courts of orders issued under
the authority of Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19,
of the Secretary of War to the Congress. (Con1942. "-Letter
gressional Hccord, March 19, 1942, p. 2804 (unbound ed.);
House Report No. 1906, 77th Cong., 2nd Scss., p. 2.)
•' • • • tho hill, when enacted, should be broad enough to enable
the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander
to enforce cur[ ew and other ,restrictions within military arelL~
und zones. "-Letter of the Secretary of War to the Chairman of
the Senute and House Committees on Military Affairs. (Con1,trcssionalRecord, March 19, 1942, p. 2807 (unhound ed.); House
Report No. 1906, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 2.)

I

, iI

In summary, the .Stutes of California, Oregon and
Washington submit that the curfew and exclusion
orders as they apply to all persons of Japanese ancestry in Pacific Coast military areas were imposed
by the military commander in good faith, acting under the authority of the President as Commander-inChief; that they were not arbitrary but were appropriately directed to securing the safety of the Pacific
Coast against threatened invasion, attack and from
sabotage and espionage. This is established by the
following factors:
1. This nation was suddenly thrust into war with
the Empire of Japan.
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2. There was a definite threat that the Pacific
Coast would be attacked by, air and sea and possibly
invaded by land.
3. There were naval attacks upon coast defenses
and installations on the California and Oregon coasts
and continual sinkings and attacks upon coastwise
shipping and convoys; Alaska was subjectoc _to air
attack and some of the islands within the Western
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The States of the Pacific Coast believe that the
matter of moving inland the ·Japanese population
from military areas must be treated solely from the
military viewpoint that such action was necessary to
meet the threat of invasion, to provide for the defense
of the area and to protect against sabotage, espionage
and fifth column activities. 00 The possibility of the
return of this group before the time when the military
authorities believe that the safety of the Pacific Coast
from these dangers will permit is looked upon with
grave conce1n by the civil authorities of Califo1nia,
Vvashington and Oregon.

6. A considerable number of Japanese American
citizens had been indoctrinated through education in
Japan.
7. The alien Japanese controlled the business of the
Japanese communities and the activities of the J apanese organizations. The native-born J apancse were
in the younger age groups and subject to the influence
and control of their alien parents.
8. The possibility that the disloyal element in the
group would be used as a fifth colwnn for sabotage
and espionage and assistance in the event of an invasion could not be overlooked.
9. The co_ntinued presence of these people within
critical areas might have been t.he cause of serious
anti-Japanese disturbances which would have interfered with the internal security of the area and might
have been the cause of reprisals upon American civilians and soldiers in the hands of the J apenese government:·
10. In the face of the emergency, time alone would
not permit the holding of individual hearings. Be-

cause of the general inability to fathom the oriental
mind, and because no adequate test could be devised
to determine loyalty with the sureness which the
situation required, the action of the Commanding
General in removing the Japanese population as a
:;roup from the critical areas was a reasonable method
of dealing with the situation. It was obviously conceived in good faith.
11. 'l'he Commanding General acted under express
authority from the President and the Congress.
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It is doubtful if flie police power of the States in
such a matter as this, which concerns national war
policy, would be adequate to take action with reference to those ,Tapanese possessing American citizenship. Furthermore, the civil criminal law is designed
to punish for injury after it has occurred, but is
wholly inadequate to take preventive action.
60
Note statement of Smith Troy, Attorney General of the
State of Washington urging that the e.vaeuation should b_i treated
as a military problom.-Tolan • Committee Hearings, Seattle, Part
~/l
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Defense Command were actually occupied by the
enemy.
4. Over 112,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were
concentrated in the three Pacific Coast States, many
in the vicinity of national defense plants, materials
and utilities.
5. This large group had cultural, religious, ideological and family ties with the enemy which had been
maintained and strengthened by the activity of
numerous pro-Japanese organizations.
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fare. Today the military should not have to wait
until an invasion has closed the Courts and deposed
the civil government before acting in the defense of
the nation's interest. In choosing the method by which
an emergency will be met the milita~y commander
should be allowed a range of honest judgment. However, the Courts must remain the final arbiter of
whether or not the officer has acted in good faith and
within the range of such judgment .
Congress, under Public Law 503, has validly provided a sanction for the enforcement of the military
regulations. These regulations are not issued by
way of any delegation but arc under the war power
of the President as Commander-in-Chief. Even if this
statute is tested from the standpoint of delegation, the
delegation, being w1der the broad scope of congressional war power, is not w1constitutional.

war.cs11a

For these reasons it is believed that in conformity
with the principles of martial law, which is the law
of necessity, military commanders in time of. war
within military areas should he able to control the
activities of the civilian population within such areas
to the extent that the military situation requires such
control. 'rhey should be able to adopt measures for the
defense -0f the area and to facilitate the prosecution
of the war.

Some general observations on the fundamental issue.

'l'he considerations advanced here are made with
a realization of the importance of preserving the
fundamental rights of all citizens, regardless of race
or color. 'l1he genius of America has ibeen its ability
to accommodate men of different races, creeds and
colors and to remove the distinctions based on these
differences. Wars with the land of origin sometimes
sharply reveal the distinctions which still exist and
point to the need for continued Americanization. 70

What is military necessity in time of war changes
with the change in the methods and strategies of war-

But in time of •war it is obvious that the great
constitutional guaranties of personal and property
War-Time Martial Rule in California, Cal. State
Bar Jr., July-August, 1942, pp. 201-202.
110•Warren,

70 Tolan Committee Final Report (H. R. No. 2124, 77th Cong.,
•
2nd Sess., May 1942), p. 11.
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"Martial rule, as we have seen, is the law of
necessity; civil government is not. The danger
is that we may get into the habit of trying to
solve through civil government matters that are
not capable of solution by our ordinary democratic processes. This may cause us to take short
cuts that violate both c011Stitutional and statutory
law. We will be encouraged to substitute for a
government of laws, a government of men who
will determine for themselves the necessity for
extra-legal action. If we do this, we are breaking down the Constitution and principles of free
government for which we are fighting. Furthermore, it is doubtful that upon the return to peace
we would be able to get back QUr democratic
processes, the type of local government and the
civil rights which we had at the beginning of the
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rights are not absolute and must bend to the para.
mount and fundamental right of the public personI
the State, to preserve itself. As former Chief Justice
Hughes said, when speaking before the American Bar
Association in 1917 at another critical period of our
history:
"We are making war as a Nation under the
constitution, from which the established national
authorities derive all their powers either in war
or in peace. Self-preservation is the first law of
national life and the constitution itself provides
the necessary powers in order to defend and preserve the United States. " 11
There is little merit in the contention that such
control exerted for 1·easons of military necessity such
as that which has 'been reviewed here will lead to
Protection against excessive
military dictatorship.
military acti.:m lies in our Courts, in the non-political
character of our Army and Navy, in an independent
Congress, and in the need for securing popular support for the conduct of the war. Because the military
authorities, under the paramount duty to preserve the
nation, may find it necessary for military reasons to
limit temporarily, within military areas, the usual
freedom of action of our citizens or the use of their
property does not mean that these rights will remain
restricted throughout the indefinite peaceful future

11War Powers Under the C01tstitution1 Report."!of A.B.A., 1917,
p. 248; Sen. Doc. 105, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., P···············-···
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12
which it .is hoped lies before us. As the Tolan Committee concluded:
"Emergencyi measures must not be permitted to
alter permanently those f.undamental principles
upon which this National was built."

'!'his will not happen while this Court sits.
At another critical war period in our history the
great Lincoln was also charged with the destruction
of constitutional liberties because of certain controls
which he exercised through his military commanders.
8peaking with that remarkable ability to summarize
a ~reat constitutional principle in a homely phrase,
be said he could no more believe that the American
people, through military action during time of war,
would lose the right of public discussion, the liberty
of speech and press, the law of evidence, trial by
jury ancl habeas corpus during times of peace any
more than he could believe that "a man could contract
so strong an appetite for emetics during temporary
illness as to persist in feeding upon them· during the
18
remainder of his healthful life".
As martial law is the law of necessity and is limited
in extent by the demands of necessity, such controls
as curfew and exclusion from military areas must
p~ with the passing of the emergency which called
them forth. Judged by this principle, the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinate military commanders
12 Tolan Committee Final Report (H. R. No. 2124, 77th Cong.,
2nd Sess., May 1942), p. 11.
13 Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoin, Vol. II, p. 167.
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must .be allowed a reasonable choice of the means by
which they will discharge the tremendous responsibility imposed on them so that they may achieve the
victory through which constitutional right.a once more
will be secure.
Dated, San Francisco, California,
May 7, 1943.
ROBERT

w.KENNY,

Attorney Gonera.l of the State of C-a.liforuia,

I. H. VAN

WINKLE,

Attorney General of the State of Oregon,

SMITH

TROY,

Attorney General of the State of Washington,

FRED

E. LEWIS,

Chief Aesietant and Acting Attorney General of the State of Washingtou,

Attorneys for said States
as Amici Curiae.
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Respectfully submitted,
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Appendix
DOT POPULATION CHARTS REPRESENTING THE CONCENTRATION OF PERSONS
ANQESTRY IN THE
OF JAPANESE
SEATTLE,

SAN

FRANCISCO

AND

LOS

ANGELES METROPOLITAN AREAS IN THE
VICINITY OF IMPORTANT MILITARY AND
NATIONAL
NAVAL . ESTABLISHMENTS,
PLANTS AND UTILITIES.
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